

A
LEARNED
TREATISE:

In three parts,

- 1 *The Definition*
 - 2 *The Distribution*
 - 3 *The Happinesse of Man:*
- } of Divinity.

As it was Scholastically handled by

JOHN STOUGHTON D.D.

in Immanuell Colledge
Chappell in Cambridge,
while he was fel-
low there:

*And now published according to the Copy left
under his own hand.*



L O N D O N,

Printed by Ric. Hodgkinson for John Bel-
lamy, Daniel Frere and Ralph
Smith. 1640.

THE
HARVARD
UNIVERSITY

THE
LIBRARY
OF THE
HARVARD
UNIVERSITY

AS IT WAS
SCHOLARSHIP
IN HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
OF THE
HARVARD
UNIVERSITY

AND NOW
PUBLISHED
UNDER
HIS OWN
HAND

THE
HARVARD
UNIVERSITY

PRINTED
FOR
THE
HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
OF THE
HARVARD
UNIVERSITY

To the Reader.

Christian Reader:

His ensuing discourse concerning the Definition and Distribution of Divinity, and the Happinelle of Man, was left perfected by the Author, under his own hand, as you have it here presented to you. : The Author in the former Sermon laying down an exact Systeme of Divinity and entring upon the explication of it, it might have been expected according to the method of Art, that he should have begun with the Definition of it. But he did purposely omit it there, because it was an Argument too Scholasticall, for a popular Auditory, but he having finished this in the Universitie in an exercise appointed for the trayning up of the sons of the Prophets, I thought it fit not to con-

To the Reader.

ceale it, but to insert it in this place, that so the treatise might be the more compleat : If it doe in some things exceed the capacity of the ordinary Reader, he must remember that the Argument it self is more Scholasticall then popular, yet much of it may be usefull to most, and all of it delightfull and profitable to the ingenious Scholar, to whom it will be the more profitable if he do peruse the rest of the Treatises : Divinity is a practicall Art, not only speculative, and so the end of it is operation : He is the best Schollar, and best understands what Divinity is, that hath learned to know and worship God so, that he may live well here and happily hereafter : If in this Treatise or those other Sermons, to which this is annexed, things doe not fall out to thy mind, divide the blame betwixt the Printer and Transcriber, and rather lay it upon the publisher then the Author : So I rest,

Thine in the Lord,



A. B.



THE
DEFINITION
OF
DIVINITY.

CHAP. I.



F *Plutarch's* discourse be
reasonable, that a Philoso-
pher should be so far from
being shy and shunning
the converse with great
Men, that are in place
and magistracy, that they

should take most pleasure in taking paines
to instruct them because their lives being ex-
emplary, their labor with them might re-
dound to the benefit of the whole common
weal: as a Physitian that hath any sparke of in-
genious honesty will delight more in the cure
of that eye which sees for many : and if that
be recorded of that of the Jewes in the Eccle-

B

siasticall

I
*Señ. 1.
Preface to the
Auditors con-
cerning the
scope.*

CHAP. I.

fiatistall history as an act of Barbarous inhumanity, *that they poisoned the fountaines in hatred of the Christians*, or mankind rather: then will I labor to forget the difficulty of this imployment, and rather think upon the publick utility of such an exercise appointed for the training up of the *Sons of the Prophets*, the curing of *the eyes* (as they call the Universities) that see for many, the healing of the waters (by casting salt into them as the Prophet *Elisba* did) *whose streamer make glad the city of God*, the Churches throughout the whole kingdom. *Cast thy bread upon the waters*, sayth the Preacher, thy seed in fruitfull ground *in locis irriguis & propterea benedictionis feracibus*, as *Junius* expounds it. Cast it as I observe, with a secure cheerfulness in hope of a rich and copious benediction.

He that makes an harpe would go more willingly about it, if he were assured, it were for one that would build the wals of *Thebes* with it as *Amphion* did: he that makes an helme if he knew it were to guide *Themistocles* his ship, in which he fought for the liberty of Greece, or *Pompey* in which he overcame the Pirats, or the famous *Argo*, in which the ancient Heroes fetch'd the golden fleece, and I think saith *Plutarch*, the Artificer had rather hew and square that wood in which *Sylons* laws were to be written, then of which a plough or some such rusticall instrument should

should be made : The accommodation is as easie for me , to incourage to this worke in hand , in this seminary of Religion and learning : as it was for him to provoke Philosophers, to apply themselves to great persons: for students in Divinity are like tables in which not the *Lawes of Solon*, but of *God* are to be written, and those that polish them with precepts, hew and square them, fit for that imploiment : like Pompeyes ship in which God overcomes the enemy of mankinde the Divell ; the most dangerous Pirat, who is therefore stiled in Scripture *the wicked one*: like Themistocles, that fights for the liberty not of Greece, but of the Gospell : like Argo that brings the golden fleece, the grace of God in Jesus Christ, who is the *Lambe of God that taketh away the sinnes of the World*, as *John* calls him : and they that furnish them with instructions, do as it were make an helme to guide them : they are like Amphion that build not the wals of Thebes but of the new Jerusalem, and he that explains the *Principles of Religion*, the *Analogy of Faith*, tunes an harpe for them, by whose sweet harmony the living stones come together into the building : And these places of learning if any, are those waters of the preacher which are *feraces benedictionis*, like that good ground in the parable that yeelds increase a hundred fold, or like the land in Babylon, that with good husbandry as you

CHAP. I.

Artic. 2.

have it in *Pliny* gives a hundred fifty encrease.

Now that the graine may hold some proportion with the ground, the seed with the soyle; and have some such multiplying virtue as they say the virginian wheat hath; every corn of which sends forth many stalks, and every stalk in the multiplicity of sides as it were in so many little granaries, stores up many scores of graine; I have made choice (according to the institution and nature of this exercise) to handle the *fundamentall points of Divinity*, (which though they may seem as they are few in number, yet are many in virtue; in light small, but great in weight; like gold which being soild is contracted into a narrow room, but may be drawn into so large an extent, that one Angel may cover an whole acre of ground as you know the naturalists have observed: And because it was the counsell of *Polybius* for history *improvidently* to frame a body of it, which is applied by a learned Divine by better right to *Divinity*. I purpose to follow that advise and contrive a body of *Divinity*: wherein if you find me vary for the form, yet you shall not for the substance: if weaknesse make me erre, yet stubbornnes shall not make me an heritick: I cannot hold it any shame after *Austin* to write *Retractions* professing my name among those, *qui proficiendo scribunt, & scribendo proficiunt*, as he speaks.

I know it will be objected against this course that I shall not be able to make any great progresse in it, muchlesse finish it, and therefore might more profitably propound some shorter project.

But I answer first, though I should but make an entrance, yet I should meet with many matters of great importance & use (as you shall perceive) which have not been explained within the memory of the greatest part of this Auditory.

Second, I hope to ride some way because I intend to point at onely all party passages and to prosecute them alone, which I shall judge fundamentall and necessary.

Third, that which shall remaine I meane God willing to fill up at other opportunities.

One thing more I desire you to remember, that as he sayd by way of Apology for himself, of the harsh & barbarous names of towns that are in the Catalogue of those things that will not be written in a florid stile, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμεῖς ὡς οἱ Ἕλληνες*, as the Greek; elegantly: so may I say of some things in Divinity; that you may not look for ornament in my discourse, but emolument: *Verba nostra non lenitiora esse volumus sed media*, to speak with *Saturnian*: The foundations of houses are laid underground, and madnes it were you know, to carve or paint them: and so it were to deck and trim the

CHAP. I.

Sect. 2.

The first definition of Divinity according to the rules of Arts.

fundamentall points of *Divinity*: they would be so fine (as we say of some effeminate gallants) that they would be the worse for it.

And thus without any more premised in commendation of this manner of proceeding, I begin with that which first offers it selfe in the consideration of any Art, *the Definition of Divinity*: which I will propound two wayes.

First according to the *Method of Art*, which as a strait garment to the body keeps close to the nature of the thing expressing it exactly, and cutting off all other things counting them but superfluities.

Second, according to the *Method of prudence*, which gives a little more scope, which inclines and bows truths, without injurious violence, to the condition and satisfaction of the Auditors, in regard of some circumstances. The first I conceive thus.

Divinity is a Doctrine of mans Happinesse. Or in equivalent termes, *of living well and happily*: wherein you have according to the law of definitions, two portions.

First, *the generall*, containing the community, by which it agrees with other Arts and Sciences; it is as they are, a *Doctrine*.

Second, *the speciall*, containing the Propriety, by which it is divided and differenced from all other and constituted that which it is in its own peculiar *essence*, which two if they be rightly taken the definition must needs be

accu-

accurate; and therefore that this may better appeare, I will indeavor to open them both severally and distinctly.

First of the *generall*, that it is a *Doctrine*, by a *Doctrine* I understand a comprehension orderly of certaine catholick precepts that are homogeneall one to another, and tend to one common scope as you know, for I do but borrow these from the ordinary notions without much scanning, because that sutes not with this exercise and argument, in which a Divine must presuppose not proove those generall principles: and the matter is not great whether you call it a *Doctrine*, or a *Discipline*, or a *Science*, or *Art*, or *Prudence*, or *Sapience*: all which words may be put upon, in the same signification, though in diverse respects; as I might easily shew, if I were not afraid I should be prevented by the time in more material things: but in this indifferency & choice of words I rather call it a *Doctrine* then otherwise.

First, Because it is in more common use among the best Divines then any other (which is the best rule to follow in this case) and sounds most gravely and fitly in my eare.

Second, Because it prevents an ambiguity, which lyes hid in the other, for whereas an *Art* is properly, those Catholick precepts, and truths, which as I said it comprehends, whether a man be habituated in the knowledge

Artic. 2.

CHAP. I.

ledge of them or not, whether they be written in books, and delivered or not, as the Logicians you know teach you to distinguish those termes of Science, Art and Prudence and the like, signifying primarily habits of the understanding, have misled many (and all the School-men) and made them misconceive the nature of them as though they were nothing else, but intellectuall habits, which indeed they are considered as attained by us, but this respect is but accidentall to them and seperable, and no wayes essentiall.

Third, I might adde that as those Arts which they call Mathematicall, have their name from learning, because by reason of their difficulty they are not often attained without learning from others, or because it was one of the first and common things, which the Ancient were wont to learne: so this name of *Doctrine* attributed to *Divinity* may intimate (as some have observed) the impossibility of attayning to this skill without a teacher (*How can I understand without a teacher*, sayd the Eunuch in the Acts to Philip) and withall the excellency of the Doctor because all that come to it must be *discipuli*, taught of God as the Scripture speaks, we have *one Doctor*, saith our Saviour, *Cathedram habet in caelo qui corda docet*, according to the Father: and so there will be a great Emphasis in this word *Doctrine*: And for these reasons, though the matter

matter be of small consequence, and though in the originall of it, it import but an extrinsecall and adventitious relation of teaching; I rather prefer this, and call it a Doctrine: and this is the gneral part of the definition, though not a Genus in exact language and rigor of speech, because as I apprehend it, the distribution of Art is not *generis in species*, but *adjuncti in subjecta*, all the distinction of them being taken from the Objects as all agree, which in an Analogicall sense are said to make a specificall difference between habits: and as in Method we call the precepts generall or speciall, though the distribution be not of that kind, but *integrū in membra* as in Logick, and the same may be said of others.

But it may be said that this seemes not the full, and immediate *Genus* (for so we will call it) because it expressees only that agreement which every Art hath with another, whereas without doubt some have neerer affinity to some then to other, for example, *Divinity* to *Ethicks* then to *Geometry*, and so are tyed together in neerer references: In answer to this I say,

First, the division of Arts is taken (as I noted even now) from the subjects by which the same thing in essence comes to be multiplied and diversified, so that the Generality of that word *Doctrine* seemes to be sufficiently restrained and limited by the mention of the

C

proper

Artic. 2.

CHAP. I.

proper object without any further curiosity.

Second, It being not agreed what is the best and most accurate distributions of Arts, I judge it more convenient to rest in that which is commonly received, and had rather that Generality too much should be taxed as insufficiency, then too much particularity should breed obscurity, especially considering that this is a place not to examin, but to set a work those grounds which *Divinity* must needs borrow from higher Arts.

Third, to give some satisfaction I will enquire of these three things.

First of the *kind* of this *Doctrine* (the thing now in question) out of the lawfull subordination of Arts.

Second, of the *condition*, whether it be *Scientia* or no.

Third, of the end whether it be Practicall or speculative; of all very briefly.

For the kind I will mention but a double Series of Arts out of which you may fetch the *primum genus* of *Divinity*, the first is known to the most or many of you, where Arts are first divided into Generall and particular, then particular into Mathematicall and Philosophicall; Philosophicall againe into Naturall and Morall; Morall into the root Theology, and the branches Ethicks; Oeconomicks and Politicks and the reit; so that if you would frame the

of Divinity.

II

CHAP. I.

the next *Genus* of *divinity* you must call it a Particular Art the root of Morall doctrine &c. I might produce many other of ancient and moderne authors if it were needfull or profitable, but I will onely suggest a second, and that in a word: as many precepts about a certaine subject collected make one Art, so many Arts make one *ἐπιστήμη*, between every of which there is as lawfull sequence and subordination as there is between the severall parts of the same Art: so that all are truly one, though we divide them (and not amisse neither) for our commodity, as *Snarez* relates the opinion of *Ægidius* and *Antonius Mirandula* concerning *Metaphisicks*: now the hint of this division must be taken from the *Objects* as I noted before: Therefore if the object of Art in generall, be *ens*, in generall as is commonly said (and for ought that I know truly) the species of Art will accompany the Species of *ens*, and goe hand in hand with them: Now *ens* is first divided into *Increatum* and *Creatum* (supposing this to be an Analogicall division according to the most received opinion, though there can be no genericall community between God and the Creature as the Schoolemen shew) and *ens* is either *de ente increato*, or *de ente creato*: Art *de ente creato*, is either of it in generall or in particular: that in generall shall treat of the nature and affections of it and the species, and

CHAP. I.

so cut out that which the particulars shall make up, which borrow their subjects from it: for all being comprised there where any affection or species swells to too great a bulk, it will send forth a colony as it were, and erect a particular Art: For example, *Reason* is a generall affection of *ens creatum*, which is so large that it deserves particular considerations, so speech, so quantity, whence *Logick*, *Grammer*, *Mathematicks* are risen: so there is scarce any species of created nature, whence some particular Art is not budded: the last of which, man, more fruitfull then the rest is branched into many: all which guide him in his operations towards his happineffe and perfection, as the generall Art (wherein he is handled as well as the rest) regulate him in his essence and constitution: and they consider man either single or in society, concerning man single, either in *ordine ad Deum*, which is *Divinity*, or in *ordine ad hominem*, which is *Ethicks*: and out of this you may collect more strictly the proper *genus* of this Doctrine from the speciall habitude to the neereſt object, which is the operations of man single, or every man as dirigible toward happines: and this may something give light and limits to the generality of the word *Doctrine* which I used; But I will not insist upon these Metaphysicall and generall notions, which are little sought into by reason of the difficult abstraction

straction from particulars, but for the same reason, are very scientificall; and hee that should travaile in them with diligence & dexterity, should do very good service to all studies: & so leaving the first inquiry concerning the kind of this *Doctrine*, I come to the second, concerning the *quality*, whether it be *Scientia*.

I promise a distinction and answer it briefly; *Scientia* is taken two wayes.

Artic. 3.

First, for an *Intellectuall habit* apprehending an infallible truth, and this is according to the notion of the word most proper, and then the question will be whether our knowledge of Theologicall truths be *Scientia*.

Second, by a *Metonymie of the Adjunct* for the *subject*, for the truths themselves apprehended, and this is most pertinent to our purpose, for you may remember I sayd that was the best meaning, when we speak of an Art or Science, and then the question is whether the precepts in Theology be such as are the Subject of such an habit, as we call a Science. *viz.* of infallible truth; Cathollicall and Scientificall.

According to this latter sense I answer affirmatively to the question, that they are, and therefore it may justly challenge the name of a Science: the precepts in this being as in other, definitions, distributions and consecratories that explaine proprieties; all which make reciprocalall and Cathollicall axioms: and if it

CHAP. I.

be objected that many things in Divinity depend upon contingent fact, as the *fall of our first parents*, and the *Incarnation of our Saviour*, with the rest of his performances, for the Redemption of man kinde, of which there cannot be a perpetuall and unvariable rule: I say,

First, these instances are but few (not many more I think then I have named) and therefore can bring no prejudice to an whol Art.

Second, *Divinity* makes not a bare historickall narration of the contingent fact; but supposing that explaines a constant affection with which it's proper Subject, man, in order to his happines, is invested upon those occasions.

Third, I distinguish the existence and essence, or rather the condition of the things, and the connexion in the Rule, the former is contingent and mutable, yet the latter may be notwithstanding immutable and constant: But these things shall appeare more plainly afterward. If the question be put in the former sence, whether our knowledge of Theologicall truths be properly Science: I say,

First, it is not much materiall what it be.

First, because the consideration of an Art is extrinsecall to the nature of it, as I concluded before of an Art in generall.

Second, if that were regarded according to the

the diverse habitudes, to diverse apprehensions the form would be diverse habits, yea contrary in one *Scientia* (as without question the knowledge that God hath of *Divinity* is *Scientia*, in another opinion which apprehends them not without doubting *cum formidine oppositi*, as the Schoole speaks, in another *Faith* that assents to them only, because commended to him by *divine* authority, and so the same habit of Theology, would be all of these, and by consequence none of them, which were absurd to say: but to come up closer to the point I say,

Second, that it may be more fully answered by this distinction of *Scientia*: *Scientia* may be taken three ways.

First, for the *knowledge* of a Catholick axiom, or an immediate proposition as other Logicians call it, whatsoever the condition of that knowledge be: and according to this acception the resolution of this question, follows from the former affirmative, because there I determined that the precepts in this *Doctrine* are such.

Second, for the certaine knowledge of any axiom, whatsoever the condition of it be: which is the most common signification of *scire* in common phrase of speech: and thus also the resolution of the question is affirmative, because the certainty of faith by which we assent to divine truths upon a divine testimony is as great

CHAP. I.

great as of any demonstrative syllogisme : and for this reason, saith *Gregory de Valentia* the nobility of this *Doctrin* deserves the name of a *Science*, and cannot well be stiled by any other.

Third, for the evident knowledge of a conclusion by a convincing reason, or demonstration, and in this sense it seems to be used by *Aristotle*; and after him the Schoolmen, and according to this strict acception the question is more doubtfull : for this including that which was most restrained in both the former, that the object must be a Catholick axiom as the first required, and that the assent must be certain, as the second exacted, superadds three qualifications.

First, that the Object must be a *Conclusion*.

Second, that the assent must be evident.

Third, that the motive must be a convincing Reason or demonstration, as it were necessitating the understanding to assent : The first and last addition I passe over, as impertinent, because few precepts of any Art are such Conclusions, for neither definitions nor distributions (which make the greater part) are so demonstrated being most prime, and immediate, and therefore cannot be proved by any that are *priora* or *magis immediata & per se*, then they are. Only it is said that passions may be so demonstrated of their proper sub-

subjects which may well be called in question by the same reason that I alleadged for the other.

Second, few Arts have such precepts except onely the Mathematicks as is observed, when it is that *αγαθὴ μαθηματικὴ*, are grown almost into a Proverbe.

Third, if they were necessary, Divinity is in the like condition with the rest for the precepts of the Art, though not for other necessary: We will therefore enquire of the second condition, and propound the question anew; whether our knowledge of Theologicall truths be evident or not.

To answer it then with as much circumspection of judgement, and yet with as little circumstance of words as may be.

First, I lay this foundation, that *Evidence* is a metaphoricall speech, from the eye to the understanding, and a relative thing importing a faire proportion of the object, to the faculty in both; so that there is a concurrence of three things to it.

First, the aptitude of the object to be discerned.

Second, the ability of the faculty to discern.

Third, the disposition of the *medium* fit for conveyance, which is distinct in the vision, but included in the two former, in the action of the understanding.

D

Second

CHAP. I.

Second, I distinguish the three principall termes of the question.

First, the knowledge of which must be considered according to his different condition either in *natura integra* or *corrupta*, for many things he did know then scientifically, which now he doth so much as opinio native-ly: and againe as corrupted, he is either immersed in it, or elevated by the infusion of grace.

Second, the precepts of *Divinity* are in a double difference, some are *eterni juris*, some are *libere voluntatis*, that I may speak so for distinction sake: for instance, in the state of innocency the promise of another life, to which *Adam* should have been exalted upon observance of the covenant, was *libere voluntatis*, as the most agree, and the precept of that I call so, though it also be indeed *eternae veritatis*, as all rules of an Art should.

Third, Evidence is either in regard of the simple termes, the things themselves, which by reason of more or lesse abstraction or such like circumstances, may be evident or obscure, more or lesse.

Or second, in regard of the connexion and cohesion of them one with another:

And now thirdly, I resolve the question in these Assertions.

First, all *Theologicall* precepts are evident to themselves though not to us, as *Thomas* distinguishes

guisbes of propositions that are *per se nota secundum se* though not *quoad nos*, of which this he gives as one *Deus est*: the reason is because the termes are essentiall one to another as they must be in all Catholick axioms.

Second, *Man in his integrity had proper Science of all those precepts*, which I called *juris aeterni*: though of the other, as a better state in another life, he had not without a double helpe.

First, *ex parte objecti*, which was Divine Revelation to convey it.

Second, *ex parte facultatis*, which was an oration of grace strengthening, and comforting it; the reason of the first part of this assertion, that man had Science of those which were *juris aeterni* is, because they were evident of themselves, and there was no impediment of his part, his faculty being proportionable to them: of the second, that the other he could not *scire* of himself, because they depended on the free liberall grace of *God*, which he could not penetrate, till it pleased him to signify his good pleasure by Revelation, and withall were supernaturall to him, and above his Spheare: the reason of the third part that those helps supposed, he could, is because then nothing was deficient, either in object or faculty, as I said of the first three Assertions: *Man solus*, can know neither the one kinde nor other, scientifically and savingly, with-

CHAP. I.

out Revelation of the object and elevation of the faculty, and then he may evidently : so that his knowledge may in truth and propriety be called Science, for the reasons hitherto intimated : I confesse I seeme in this to strive against the streame of the Schoolemen, who seem to make evidence of the nature of Faith, out of the Apostle, who saith *faith is of things that are not seen*, and make faith and science opposite habits ; but they also may admit a good interpretation : for I think they meane of the condition of some things, not the connexion of the termes in the precepts, or of man considered with naturall reason only, to which I grant they are not evident : But if there be any doubt of this last (to which I have without any necessity condescended) I think the former answers may suffice : And so I will passe from this, adding but this one observation, that when an *Art or Doctrine* is called *Scientia*, there is a Synecdoche in the word, for properly the knowledge of one scientificall axiom is a science, and in that sense, neither Divinity (as *Durand* and *Arminensis* well dispute) are one Science, but so many conclusions (so they call them) as there are so many sciences, yet by this Synecdoche as I sayd the collection of many are called one, and are so *unitate ordinis*, which sufficeth sayth *Gregory* of Valentia to the unity of a Science.

Artic. 4.

And now I come to the third inquisition
of

of the end, whether this doctrine be *Speculative* or *Practical*: where I premise a few necessary observations for the better understanding of it, and then resolve it in a word.

First observe *Speculative* and *Practical* are not specificall differences of Arts and essentially, but accidentall only, as *Valentia* rightly judges more probable, though I like not his reason, because sayth he, they are taken from the objects as things, for Arts as I said are specifically distinguished by their objects in that large sense of specificall before mentioned, but because they are taken from the habitudes, which Art. have to us, who use to aime at Speculation, or operation in the purchase of them and end in those.

Second, every Praxis doth not constitute and denominate a Practicall Art, but you must note a threefold latitude in the use of this word.

First, in the largest extent of the signification, it comprehends these three things under it *theoria*, *praxis* and *poiesis*, for all these are operation, the first of the understanding, the second of the will, the third of all the faculties.

Second, in the narrowest it is opposed on one side to *theoria* on the other to *poiesis*, and then imports nothing but the second, the *elicitus actus voluntatis*, as *Scotus* speaks, or an immanent act perfected within it self.

Third, in the middle way it is opposed

CHAP. I.

to *noela*, but includes the two latter : now in both these latter acceptions, it is taken when we speak of a practicall discipline, but more principally and more particularly in this question, in the first of them the middle of the three :

Third, the *verities*, and character of a practicall Science is not the end that any particular man makes to himselfe, for that is fallible, for in both kinds of practicall, *no modo & negatione*, they may propound to themselves Speculation as a Gentleman may study Architecture for delight in the contemplation, and do study both Divinity and Morality whose purpose if it be not bare Speculation I know not, but the issue we see is not practise; therefore the judgement of this must be from the nature of the object, and the end of the art it self: These observations being thus dispatched, I answer in a word affirmatively that Divinity is a *Practicall Doctrine*, and conclude this truth in this one Reason : That Art is practicall whose Subject is *res operabilis à nobis*, in the language of the Schoole, and whose proper end is operation, for these make it practicall, and it is sayth *Durand* very well, practicall, *radicaliter à subjecto formaliter à fine*, but Divinity is such as shall appeare in the explication of the latter part of the *Definition* immediately succeeding; therefore *Divinity is Practicall*.

Second, things may be objected against the Assumption of this Syllogisme.

First, that *God* is the object of *Divinity*, who is not *res operabilis à nobis*, and therefore the first condition of a Practical Art is not found in this: I defer the full answer of this till I come to a particular decision of that question which shall be the next time, for the present I say *God* is not the subject of *Divinity* nor principally considered in it according to his nature for he that doth so sayth *Durand*, *sumit formam Philosophi*, but in Relation to our works as they are terminated in him *objective*, and in some sense that is true, which the same Author affirms, not *qua Deus*, as the *Thomists* would have it, but *qua salvator*, not *qua cognoscendus*, say I, but *qua colendus*.

Second, it is objected that the last end of Divinity is the vision of *God*, which is speculative and therefore the second condition of a Practicall Art agrees not to Divinity, to which I answer.

First, the last end of Divinity is eternall happinesse, but not the whol end, and in eternall happines that vision is something, but not all, for without doubt there shall be many other operations, as praying of *God* &c. To w^{ch} that is rather subordinate then otherwise.

Second, the next end makes an Art Practicall not the remote, but that vision is as *Durand* disputes: yet that is produced by an habit

habit of glory, which is of another kinde, then our habit of Divinity; but these things shall appeare better in that which follows: Therefore I still hold that conclusion that it is Practicall: and that Scripture gives good testimony to this truth, *Evidenter apparet consideranti omni Scripturam a principio usque ad finem, quia semper pro una scriptura columna in qua agitur de his quae sunt pure speculabilia à nobis sunt plusquam quingenta folia in quibus agitur de pure practicis*, as *Durand* writes: I will alleage some few places to make this good in part. 1. *Tim. 15. The end of the Commandment is charity.* Out of which and such like places *Alexander Hales* made it a third, neither Speculative nor Practicall; but Affective, which opinion is true though not in opposition to practick, for that affection is in order to action, that that is the last: more plainly. 2. *Tim. 3. 16. 17. All the scripture is profitable for doctrine for instruction in righteousness that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished eis tōn isōtōn diōdoyn, to every good work: John 13. 17. If you know these things, blessed are ye if ye doe them, sayth our Saviour. James 1. 22. But be ye doers of the word and not hearers onely deceiving your selves.* I shall not need to heap up more: for *scotus* and many of the best Schoolemen concur in this opinion, and all our modern and orthodoxe Divines with one consent agree in it: and therefore I will conclude

clude this in the words of Bernard, *Is recte legit Scripturas divinas*, and so *Theologiam, qui verba vertit in opera* : Blessed are they that heare the word of God and keep it.

The last time I propounded the first definition of Theology conteyning so much, as I conceived necessary for the accuratenesse thereof : which was this that *Theology is a Doctrine of mans happinesse* : and then I dispatched the former and generall part of it, that it was a *Doctrine*, explaining foure things for the clearing of it.

First, how it was a doctrine and wherefore I called it so, rather then by any other name.

Second, what kind of doctrine in particular that seeming large and generall.

Third, what manner of doctrine for the condition and quality whether *scientia* or not.

Fourth, what was the end of it whether Speculation or Praxis.

It remaines now that I proceed to the second and particular part of that definition that this doctrine is of *Mans happinesse*, that this same thing may be expressed in other equipollent terms I touched before, and mean not to trouble my self, or you with unnecessary scruples in that kind : whether you list to speak as I have done, or like beter to call it, a *doctrine of living well*, with Ramus ; or a *Doctrine*
E guiding

Artic. 5.

CHAP. I.

guiding man to his happynes; or such like, the sense being the same, the terms are indifferent: but thus much I wish to be observed in the words.

First, that I call it happines rather than *salvation*, because this latter word in the common acception there of implies and presupposes a state of evill and misery from which man is to be saved, which is not generall enough for our purpose, being but one parcell of that divinity doctrine as it is usually and rightly handled of all, and as you shall perceive by that short declaration of the parts, which I shall make the next time.

Second, I rather mention happynes in generall then eternall happines, as the most either expresse, or understand it; for the same reason: because though that be the highest and last and principall, to which all other things in Divinity are in their kinde subordinate, yet it is not all: for both *Adam* in the *state of integrity* had actuall felicity, and should still have had so long as he continued in integrity & so have the *children of God in the state of Regeneration*, though they be translated into the kingdome of heaven and glorified, though this be of a lower ranck and order then that other: so that Eternall happinesse is too narrow for the generall end of this Art: except perhaps it be widened two wayes.

Either first, by extending the signification of

of the word eternall happinesse (which is ordinarily taken for that estate which abides with the children of *God* in the kingdom of heaven; because that is to indure without alteration and change to all eternity) so that it may take that happinesse of this life along with it, both together making but one context of Eternall happines.

Or secondly by changing the whole phraze, delivering the sense in these or the like terms that it is a Doctrine teaching to live well here, that we may live happily hereafter and that to all perpetuity, which will come to the same effect: thus much you may observe for the word

Second, under the word *Happines*, I comprehend both the *end* it self, to which that word is in a manner appropriated, and all those *means* that lead unto it which are either, those gracious acts of *God* such as are *Redemption*, *Vocation*, *Justificatio*, *Sanctificatio* & the rest, or those *pious acts of man*, w^{ch} are necessary for the obtaining thereof, especially those that directly and immediately have *God* for their object, being his proper worship and service: whether these actions have a Relation of efficiency to that happines, under which notion we conceive of *means* ordinarily, and perhaps not amisse in this case, if we speak of happines as it signifies that future estate of glory; or whether rather those actions are parts of it, or happines it self, which respect seemes to agree

CHAP. I.

better to it, as it is taken generally for the whol end of man, and makes the adequate subject of this Art : because as you know the Phylosopher defines felicity to consist in the operation according to virtue : And according to this explication of the word, you may easily discern that those opinions would not stand in opposition one to the other, one of which saith that mans operations are the subject of this Doctrine : as *Durand* doth, expressing it in these words *actus meritorius*, (sayth he in their Popish language) is the subject of Divinity, and better *actus humanus ordinabilis in beatitudinem* : as *Arminius* also in his private disputations makes, *actio hominis quam Deo prestare tenetur*, and in word *Religio*, which is the same with the former, only it omits the reference that those actions have to the end, happines, which notwithstanding the same author addes expressly in his definition of Theology : But the other makes Happines the subject of this doctrine : which hath no repugnancy to the former as I said but includes it as subordinate : And thus I judged it to sure better then the other : for these two reasons,

First, because *actus Religionis*, is not large enough for the whole latitude of Theological precepts for there be some, as I noted of the Acts of *God* which are necessary to make man happy : it being as impossible in ordinary

nary course, that man should be reduced to his perfection, his happiness, without the culture of *Gods grace*, as it is that other inferior creatures should be reduced to their perfection, their last end; without intervention of mans care: there being the like proportion in the dependance of other creatures upon man, to be managed by him; that there is of man upon God; to be managed by him, and something more:

Second, the *acts of Religion*, may be reduced to happiness by a more direct attribution then happiness can be reduced to them: and therefore seeing both are contained, and it is not needfull to expresse both, I made choice as neere as I could of the fittest: And so much also of the signification of these words.

Third, therefore to dispatch the explication of this latter part of this definition, and shew how these words of *mans happiness*, containe the specialities of divinity: they may sustaine a threefold relation.

First, of the *subject*, because this doctrine is conversant about the nature and affections and parts of happiness.

Second, of the *form*, because Arts being distinguished by their objects the form is always included in them.

Third, of the end, which indeed is primarily either of the artificer, or rather of the sub-

CHAP. I.

ject; and so secondarily may be considered as of the Art it selfe: the first therefore of the subject is the most principall and essentiall relation as you see, and requires a little further illustration.

That is the subject of a Science or Art saith *Gregory de Valentia*, which is the subject of those conclusions (as he calls them) or precepts that are principally intended in that Science: and distinguishes nicely between this *subjectum & objectum*, which he makes the precepts themselves where you may note *scientia*, to be taken for the habit of our understanding: *Durand* also distinguishes between *subjectum in quo*, which he makes the understanding to be of all Arts, and *subjectum de quo*, of which the present question is, and that saith he must have these three conditions.

First, it must be *aliquid incomplexum scilicet terminus & non propositio*.

Second, it must be *primo & principaliter consideratum in scientia*, and all things there must have *attributionem ad ipsum*.

Third, it must be such *de quo aliqua predicari possint denominativè*: that third of these is obscure by reason of a Scholasticall terme, but included in the former, for any thing materiall: and the two former agree with that I brought out of *Valentia*: so that not to hold you longer in this, I conclude that in a word

to

to be the subject of a Science, that is the subject of the Scientificall precepts therein contained: now I assume, But mans happines so taken as I have explained it, including all the meanes unto it and the parts of it, is the subject of the precepts of divinity which are principally intended in it, as might appeare by a particular enumeration now, and shall better afterward: for except the definition it selfe of Theology, wherein it is a part of the prædicate it or some part or affection of it is the subject in all the rest: there being many precepts of this Art, because there be many particulars of this subject, as I shewed the last time that Arts are multiplied because their subjects are multiplied: and the unity of a Science likewise depends upon the unity of of the subject: I conclude therefore that *mans happinesse is the Subject of Divinity*: man is as it were the *materiale* and happines the *formalis ratio subjecti*: And thus much of this first definition of Theology that it is a *Doctrine of mans happines*.

There may be diverse things objected both against this latter part, which I have passed over more lightly and lesse distinctly then I purposed for some reasons, and against the whole: but I shall meet with them more conveniently in another place, and that by and by, and therefore will not meddle with them here, the rather also because I have detei-

CHAP. I.

deteined you too long already in the entrance.

Only give me leave to illustrate this definition out of the Scripture, for though the word of *God* aime not at the laying down of artificiall and notionall truths; but bears almost altogether upon fundamentall in a method of divine wisdom and prudence: yet even those must have the ground and substantialls, from thence, though Art may put a form and modification upon them: therefore it will not be amisse to give some light to this definition out of it: The places are infinite, which I might alleage, but I will confine my selfe to a few, and that of two sorts.

The first point at it, in generall as for instance. *John* 6. 68. *Peter* calls the doctrine of our Saviour, *panem vitae aeternae*, for when our Saviour upon occasion of the going back of many of his disciples from him asked his Apostles, *will ye also go away*, this is *Peters* answer; *whether shall we go? thou hast the words of eternall life: Luc.* 1. 77. It is stiled *panem aeternae*, for in *Zacharies* song this is said to be the scope, and imployment of *John* the forerunner of *Christ*, *to prepare the wayes of the Lord to give knowledge of Salvation to his people in the forgiveness of their sins: Acts* 13. 26. *Paul* termes the preaching of the Gospell by himself, and the rest of the Apostles *evangelium*: as that evill spirit in the maid, *Acts* 16.

17. to the same effect in a Scripture metaphor calls it *ἡ οὐρανοῦ* *the way of Salvation*. I will content my selfe with these that I have already mentioned though many more offer themselves and perhaps more pregnant.

The second sort of places seeme more fully to comprehend the definition, of which it shall suffice to have produced but three, 1. *Tim.* 6. 3. the Apostle *Paul* expresseth it in these words, *ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν διδασκαλία*, a *Doctrine of Religion or godlines, or according to godlines*, which by some of our Divines is used in so many words to this purpose; and therefore I need not stand to explain it: only I observe that this defines it by the means to happines rather then the end happinesse it self, as you may remember I said some Divines did: the second place is more plaine and full. *Tit.* 1. 1. *ἐπιγινώσκεις ἀληθείαν τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν πίστεως ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ζωῆς αἰωνίου*, where you may have both expressly mentioned: the third and last place; is rather more accurate for, 2. *Tim.* 3. 15. the Scriptures, and so the rule of Divinity contained in them are thus circumscribed, *τὰ ἐν ἡμεῖς χάρις καὶ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ σωτηρίου τοῦ ἐν σοφίᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς*: I should enlarge these with explication and accomodation of them to my present scope, but they are perspicuous of themselves; and I have been too tedious in this matter: I will therefore ob-

CHAP. I.

serve this onely in all together, that the Scripture instead of happines useth rather to name *eternall life and Salvation*, the latter because it is directed all to man saſe, who muſt be raiſed from miſery; ſo that his happineſſe is properly Salvation: the former, becauſe the moſt noble member of our happines is eternall life, and therefore by a familiar Synecdoche names that for all and inſiſts in that: and both in a diſpenſation of heavenly wiſdome, becauſe they carry moſt majeſty and divine authority with them, and are moſt powerfull & efficacious to work upon the heart of man: And ſo I leave this firſt definition, and paſſe to the ſecond.

Sect. 2.

Now the ſecond, as you may remember I ſaid in the beginning, is to bow the ſame truth a little to the common apprehenſion taking liberty to diſpenſe with the ſtrictneſs and ſeverity of Art, by Prudence, and that I think may be firſt conceived in theſe or the like words; *Divinity is a Doctrin revealed by God in his word which teaches man how to know and worſhip God, ſo that he may live well here and happily hereafter*: I intend not to ſpend any time about thoſe parcels in this definition, wherein it agrees with the former: and for circumſtantiall differences, I will paſſe them over likewise, becauſe I ſuppoſe there will not ariſe any difficulty, which may not tolerably be ſatiſfied out of that which hath been ſaid already.

There

There be two additions onely of moment, which must be expended.

First, concerning the *Scripture*.

Second ; concerning the *knowledge of God*.

The first, I shall cleare in the opening of these three propositions.

First, that divine Revelation is not the *formalis Ratio* of the subject of Theology.

Second, that mention of the *Scripture* is not to be inserted into the definition of divinity, when we go about to lay downe the nature of it accurately.

Third, that for some circumstances of prudence it may be convenient to do it : the truth of which three I shall shew in a word.

For the first: *Valentia* distinguishing of *formalis ratio quæ & sub qua*, makes *divine Revelation* the formall respect of the subject of Theology according to the latter, and the *Thomists* generally make *ens divinum Revelabile* : and make good the unity of this Doctrine by that, though it treat of many different things as *God* and the creatures &c. Yet it is one because all are considered in one formall respect as they are revealed, which is enough : and he goes so far that in answer to an argument of *Aureolus*, to the contrary, that if that were true, if *God* should reveale *Mathematicks* and *Metaphysicks* to one man they would be but one Science because there

CHAP. I.

would be the same *ratio formalis sub qua*, viz. divine Revelation he thinks it no absurdity to grant so much.

But, I take it, this cannot be: for if Revelation were the *formalis*, by which any thing were brought into the compasse of Divinity; then,

First, nothing should be handled there, but *quatenus Revelatum*, and so Divinity should have no proper subject of its own.

And second, every thing *quatenus Revelatum*, should be handled there, upon which must needs follow this inconvenience that the truths of all Arts should belong to Divinity, because many of them are revealed in the Scripture (as for example, naturall, morall, Politicall, Historicall, Architectonicall, Mathematicall, and almost of all kinds) at least all of them may be revealed, if God pleased, as well as Theologicall are.

And second it would follow, that Theology should not be distinguished from other Arts by any essentiall difference; but only by this extrinsecall respect, *of being revealed which may as I said be a common affection of all truths: 'tis true indeed that *de facto*, all truths necessary to Salvation are Revealed and *de jure* they had need to be revealed, and if that opinion aimed at no more I think it should offend not against the verity of the thing so much as the propriety of the language but

but they seeme to say more, and in that sense I reject it.

For the second, that mention of the Scripture is not to be made in the definition of Divinity, when we go about to lay down the nature of it accurately I shew it thus.

First, because it is but an extrinsecall relation as hath been said, and therefore as it were absurd to say of Logick, that it is an Art of Reason delivered in *Aristotles Organon*, or in *Ramus*, and it were inconvenient to define any Art, that it was such an one attained to by naturall reason and humane industry, (which have the same habitude, to the Sciences of humanity that Revelation hath to the Doctrine of Divinty) so in a like (I say not an equall) proportion, it would be at least unnecessary to interpose this in the definition of Theology that it is revealed by God in his word:

Second, because it is not of so generall consideration as to be placed in the title and frontispiece of the Art, as may if you do but remember,

First, the *finis cui*, or the object of the Scripture, which is either onely, or especially *mansalva*, in which estate it is absolutely necessary that he should have the word of God, to bee his guide toward his true happines.

And second, if you remember the efficient cause of the Scripture which beside the princi-

CHAP. I.

all, the *holy Spirit*, is instrumentall, *holy men inspired by God* the pen-men of the holy Ghost which were alway extraordinary ministers of the Church having such immediate assistance of the Spirit : now both these the fall of man and extraordinary officers of the Church, without which the nature and use of the Scriptures cannot well be unfolded, are of later consideration and follow afterward in the body of this Art : and therefore the treating of the Scripture cannot be exalted so high as the definition without an obscure anticipation of exact order.

For the third, that this notwithstanding, it may be convenient to define it, so for some circumstances of prudence, it will be no hard matter to demonstrate.

First, because it contains all thing necessary to Salvation, and therefore is coextended with the object of Divinity, and in this sense also the Scripture may be called a Rule or Canon, because though it be not every way adequate, as that uses to be (containing many things in it which are not properly Theological, as I noted before) yet it hath all those things in it : but it is more aptly resembled to a Rule or Canon, as it respects faith and things to be believed, with which it is every way reciprocated, for every thing revealed in the Scripture is to be believed, and every truth to be believed is revealed in Scripture.

Second

Second ; because all men now are in the state of corruption of the fall , so that it is absolutely necessary as the case stands for all men : and so it is well commended to all in in the very entrance as a principle and ground of all that followes , and is placed at the top as a candle upon a candlesticke to give light better to all the roome : And thus much of the first addition in this latter definition, *that Divinity is a Doctrine revealed by God in his Word.*

The second follows, which is , that this *Doctrine teaches man to know God* ; concerning which , I shall deliver my minde what I think in so many propositions likewise.

First, that *God* is not the subject of divinity.

Second, that he is not (according to his nature) at all to be handled in divinity.

Third, that there is just reason why he may and should according to the method of prudence.

The first may appeare by the same argument negatively concluded, by which I proved that man, as he is to be guided to his end or *eudæmonia* (which in a reasonable nature is called happines) is the true subject about which all the precepts in this Art are conversant : but I passe over that.

Second, it may appeare by this reason , because divinity as hath been proved, is a practi-
call

CHAP. I.

call Art not a Speculative: now a Practicall Art is that whose end is operation and that immediate not *mediate*, as *Valentia* well observes, for the remote and mediate end of any contemplative Science, may be operation; and a Practicall Art hath alway such an object, as is *res operabilis à nobis*: but if *God* be the subject, neither of these can agree to it, as it is more then manifest: therefore *God* is not the Subject.

The second, that *God* is not at all to be handle in Divinity, though perhaps it be included in the former and might be proved by the same reasons; if he be neither the subject nor part of the subject, yet because it will seem more strange to some. I will rather prove it distinctly, and severally.

First, because Divinity, as we for the most part generally conceive of it, is a particular Art one of the lowest and last: but *God* must be needs handled in the first, or very neer the first: for if *ars* be ranked according to *ens*, *God* who is the first being, may justly challenge the first Art at least, next to that of Art in generall if there be any such in the whole *universum*.

Second, because if there were any reason why *God* should be handled in this Art, it would be this, because he is the object of the operations of man which are here regulated namely (in which regard I deny not, but he may

may be called a remote object of it) but this is not sufficient, because by the same reason the nature of man should be handled here also, he being the object of some acts, as for example, of charity and the rest: which to say would be held absurd:

Third, because supposing that to be, true that it is an Art Regulating mans actions and directing him to his happiness, which I think is out of question, I cannot see how things of so different nature can be homogeneous to the same scope, and beside the unity of a Science will not bear it, as *Keckerman* sayth well, even in this respect, because it should be both practical and Speculative, which are indeed incompatible though some Schoolemen have attempted such a reconciliation: It may be objected,

First, that it can be handled in no other Art: But I have prevented this objection when I reasoned that it must be in the first art, before we descend to the treatise of *ens creatum*: and *Bradwardine* confirms me in this, saying that *Dens est* that truth is the first of all, upon which all other verities have dependence.

Second, the very name *Theologia* argues God the subject of it: I answer.

First, I granted before that he is the remote object namely of mans operations performed to him, and that may save the Etymology.

Second, the name supposed, the reason may be drawn otherwise then from the subject, as from the author and efficient *God*, or from the end because it is to bring us to *God*, &c.

Third, which *Durand* Arts (or habits as he speakes) are many times denominated not a *formal ratione subjecti*, but a *digniori*, & so it might well come to passe that Divinity, which is *Scientia salutis humana*, might be denominated from *God*: where I observe that he falls upon the same definition that I have given.

Fourth, the imposition of the name usually follows the common opinion (which was so, I confesse) rather then the accurate truth of things, which perhaps would rather call this art *Anthropologia*, or some like name then *Theologia*: lastly the consent of all may be objected as a prejudice against this opinion: But I answer.

First, it is no strange thing for many to erre in such a matter of notion, artificiall rather then substantiall truth, and yet many give good hints of that which I have said.

Second, the error hath been not so much positive in defending, as negative in not attending or expending this truth, not so much of judgement maintaining, as practise following this, which also they had good reason for, which I must shew in the last proposition.

Thirdly, therefore I say that the Doctrine
of

of God is not unfairly handled in Divinity.

First, because the nature of God and our actions tending to happinesse are of so neere affinity, for the former affords a firm ground to build the latter upon, so that the explication of that is necessary to this which indeed should be supposed out of an higher Art as I have often intimated; but seeing God communicates the knowledge of the one, to men of the common sort, it would not be expedient to distract them between two arts; but it is much better to comprise them in the same, by a dispensation of Prudence condescending to their capacity.

Second, because they are conjoynd in Scripture in which the knowledge of both is conveyed unto us joyntly, therefore Divines finding them there together thought it not meet to seporate them in their treatises.

Third, this is a singular priviledge and prerogative of the Schoole of *Christ*, that in it all Chriffians besides the way to their own felicity, in which they are properly directed, do withall learne the knowledge of God in all his excellencies, which must needs adde much grace and majesty to the former: and thus much of this third proposition, and of both the definitions of Divinity in generall, me thinks too much, and yet when I looke to the partienlars too little, too jejune & nakedly.

CHAP. I.

The uses may be,

First, for instruction to teach us that this Art concernes all, every one must be of this trade, for it is of Mans felicity.

Second for exhortation.

First, to *thankfulnesse*, second to *diligence*, from the *Certainty*, *Nobility* and *Necessity* of this Doctrine.

I will not trouble you with repetition of any thing that hath been formerly delivered, only because that which follows hath the rise and ground out of that which is gone before, Let me call to your mind the definitions of Theology, which I have hitherto propounded and in some homely manner expounded, and that in generall only : . the first was a *Doctrine of mans Happinesse, or of living well and happily*, which I thought sufficient for accuratenesse: the second was this, that *Divinity is a doctrine revealed by God in his word, which teacheth man to know and worship God so that he may live well here, and happily hereafter*. Which perhaps as I said may give more popular satisfaction though according to the rules of Art, if it were examined, there may be some superfluities in it to be cut off as I shewed: and thus having only presented these a fresh to your consideration, that you may the more clearly understand the succeeding discourse, I begin with that where I left, then to draw some practicall observations out of that which
hath

hath been taught, before I proceed any further: and they shall be but two.

First for *Instruction*, we may learn from hence that this Art or Doctrine belongs not to some few, onely, but concernes every man to know and practice.

Second for *Exhortation*, and that twofold.

First, to *thankfulness*, that God hath planted us like trees by the rivers of waters, and taking such care to guide us in the way of happiness.

Second, to *diligence*, in the use of those meanes and golden oportunities, which God hath afforded us, toward the gaining of our happines in this seminary of Religion and learning, which we cannot let slip unlesse we will shamefully betray our owne soules.

The first appeares out of the definition because it is a doctrine of mans happines: where you see both the *materiall subject man*, and the *formall happines* intimate unto us, and commend the consideration of the generality of this Art, that the use thereof extends it selfe indifferently unto all men: indeed if there be any that have drunk so deep of *Circes* cup, that are so bewitched with the Sirens songs, so besotted with the charmes of pleasure, that they have put off the shape and name of men, and are turned into beasts, or if any that beare the name and shape of men are so degenerated from their nature that they are not asha-

med

CHAP. V.

med to confesse themselves altogether voyde of humanity; they may perhaps consequently to that hypothesis though not reasonably, reject this Art as nothing appertayning to them: but if they be men *homo sum, humanitas nihil à me alienum puto*, as you know he said, if they be men, this is the doctrine concerning man to guide and regulate him, of which therefore they may not only claime the use, but also challenge propriety in it: for it is a *Doctrine of mans happinesse*: man may be conceived as the materiall object of it, and so that implyes the generality of it reaching to every man: Againe if there be any Art concerning man, which perhaps concerns not every man in particular, and so the former illustration be thought insufficient; yet that which is of mans Happinesse, the generall end of all, must needs belong to all: except there be any that have so far defaced the image of God in their Soules, that they have blotted out also even those common principles which nature hath left engraven and imprinted not only in men, that are endued with the highest perfection of reason, but also in all creatures (at least in a kind of Analogy) that have but the lowest degree of being; all which have a naturall *impetus* or *appetitus* to their perfection, which in the reasonable nature is called properly *Happines*: and though men be divided in their desires and inclinations toward

par.

particular good, some affecting one thing
 some another according to the variety of their
 dispositions, yet all agree in this generall, all
 hunt after happinesse: Though *bonum* be not
 defined according to the proper essence accu-
 rately, *quod omnia appetūt*, yet with the empha-
 ticall article. I think it may be not absurdly de-
 scribed as the Philosopher hath done it, *visu-
 tur igitur & natura ipsius*: that good is that which e-
 very one desires, every one desires to be hap-
 py: and though all they misse their marke
 when they thinke to finde it here below, *bea-
 tam vitam quærunt in regione mortis*, as *Au-
 stin* speaks, yet in grosse they aime at this: and
 therefore this Art, as this end, is generall and
 concerns every man: And thus it appears
 that this observation is reduced out of the
 former definition, which I therefore mention
 least any here should think the study of this *ali-
 enum opus*, a matter that pertains little to him,
 and therefore behave himselfe as it is said of
Gallio in the Acts, *as if he cared not for these
 things*: whosoever thou art if thou hast but
 the nature of a man, if thou hast but any pro-
 pension to happinesse, *hoc ad te pertinet*, the
 study of Divinity belongs unto thee: the
 wisdom of swaying scepters and managing
 Kingdomes and Common wealthes, which
 the Philosopher stiles the Architeconicall art,
 may prescribe to every man a particular im-
 ployment and vocation, according to their
 naturall

CHAP. I.

naturall abilities in subordination to the publick utility, but every one must take this along with him, this is the generall calling of all men, which they must walke in directing all their actions to this end: this is one difference of this, from other Arts: The great Turk himselfe they say, you know though born to beare rule and inherit the Empire, yet beside is trayned up to some trade of life, which he exerciseth perhaps in his Royall palace and chaire of estate: I am sure the greatest Princes and Potentates must be skild in this trade or else all their glory will be not only *splendida servitus* as he said, but also *splendida miseria*: the Rabbins had such a constitution that all their Doctors together with the profession of Divinity should joine the practise of some handicraft: what the convenience of that was I know not, but I see a necessity of the contrary, that every craftsman with the profession of his craft, should joine the practise of Divinity; Some are employed in *Magistracy*, some in *Merchandise*, some in *Agriculture*, or otherwise, but from the highest Statesman to the lowest craftsman, all should be divines; all should be employed in this: Not so that every one should be, or labor to be a teacher of others, as we commonly take the name of a Divine, otherwise then that generall obligation to the private duties of charity, as admonition and the like, that is not my

my meaning: but that he should be able at least to teach himselfe and guide his owne actions to the last end of all his happinesse: And thus far I say it stands every one in hand to be a Scholar in this Schoole, least any should be misled with that vulgar opinion which rejects all knowledge and study in this kind, as proper to Divines: But wherefore then hath God tempered the stile of his word, and bowed it to the capacity of all sorts of men; *modum ipse dicendi sacra Scriptura quo contextit? sayth Austin, quamvis paucis penetrabilis omnibus tamen accessibilis*: that I may a little alter his words, *Nam quæ aperta continet ea quasi amicus familiaris sine fuco ad cor loquitur indoctorum ac doctorem: ea verò quæ in mysteriis occultat, nec eloquio ipso superbo erigit, quo non audeat accedere mens tardiuscula & inerudita quasi pauper ad divitem sed invitat omnes humili sermone quod non solum manifesta sed etiam secreta exerceat veritate &c.* And wherefore hath God erected his oracles every where in his Church, and his Schools and the chaire of *Moses* in every Congregation, to have them taught and expounded: whereas other Sciences are professed and practised in some places only of the Commonwealth: but that they belong to all, & must be part of the care of every man? but I need not urge this, neither did I purpose any more then to propound it when I first thought upon it: especially

H

cially

CHAP. I.

cially in this place and among you, who both by the generall appellation that is given to Universities, that are called the *Schoolers of the Prophets*, and by particular situation of this, compassed with hils as *Jerusalem the vally of vision*, and by proper dedication of this Colledge, whose gates will scarce admit of any, but such as are at the least welwillers to Divinity, but as *Plato's* Auditory exacted Geometry οὐδὲν ἀγνομήντων εἰσὶν, so this seemes to examine as it were and pose every one it receives in their purpose for Divinity *Sacrae Theologiae studiosis posuit*: All which do put you in mind that howsoever others may stand affected to this study, yet it behoves you to be in a singular measure addicted thereunto, and desire to be in the number of those that not only in the Apostles words, *let the word of God dwell in them richly and plentifully*, but also labor for it, and therefore as it were dwell continually in the study of it: and true it is of these places that *Nazianzen* speaks, I think of his mother at least a godly morther, μάλλον ἔδρασε τοῖς θείοις λόγοις ἢ γάλαξί, or to that purpose for I do not well remember his direct words: they are mothers in *Israel* to nurse and give suck; that same γάλα the sincere milke of the Word as *Peter* calls it to us that we may prove *Nathaneels true Israelites in whom there is no guile*: so doth she deserve that title of *Alma mater*, which you see

see written in her Arms : and we may well beare that devise which *Domitian* used where his word was this *optime matris* : as you have it in *Tacitus* : And thus much of the first observation that the use of this Doctrine extends it selfe generally to all men, and to us in a more particular manner : wherein because I have been longer then I purposed, I will passe over the rest, though more material, the more briefly.

The second follows for *Exhortation*,

And first to *thankfulnesse* upon a double ground.

First, that God hath set us in so honorable a station, a calling so worthy as you see that of a Divine must needs be, whose employment is about that knowlegde, a small portion of which to have attained is the happinesse of other men : what though the tribe of *Levi* hath no inheritance among their brethren, shall not we thinke this a Royall recompense of that want, since the Lord is their inheritance, the Lord is their portion, *Quis id credidit*, as *Lucian* speaks of his Preists, not their revenues are their, God as some prophane person might invert the words & pervert the meaning, like them whom the Apostle *Paul* reproves that would have gaine to be godlinesse, which he corrects affirming that godlinesse is great gaine, so here God is their revenues: let other professions please themselves in the gaine or glory

CHAP. I.

that they procure, *Dat Galenus opes, dat Justinianus honores*, I envy them not: but let my Soule delight in the law of the Lord and meditate therein day and night, and let me alway account that the chiefe part of my blessednes: *Prayse the Lord ye house of Israel, for in Jury is the Lord known, he hath given his statutes to Israel*: great is the priviledge of the Jew, for them did the Lord betrust with his Oracles: but especially prayse the Lord ye house of Aaron, prayse the Lord ye house of Levi, whom he hath entertained into neerer service: though your condition be full of difficulties and your vocation obnoxious to the obloquies of the world, say with the Psalmist, *The lots have fallen to me in pleasant places, yea I have a faire heritage*: and this may be the first ground of thankfulness, in a word plainly, that God hath honored us with such a calling in which we have liberty and meanes to study for that which all desire, the Art of Happinesse:

The second is from this, that God affords so many meanes unto us to furnish us for the discharge of this calling, *ina aptus ē ē vñ Deus ad opus*, that the name of God may be even and square and perfect to all due performances, you all know and have heard often how Plato thanked the Gods that he was borne a Gracian, an Athenian, and especially in the time of Socrates: and you can all make the application without my helpe, that you have greater cause
to

to thank God that you are born Christians in the wombe of the true Church, that you are brought up Athenians in the bosom of a most famous Univerſity, and that in this flourishing eſtate of Religion, and time of the goſpell, when God hath powred forth of his Spirit ſo plentifully among us eſpecially in theſe places, that as *Plutarch* ſaith of the neighbour villages of *Rome* in *Numa's* time, that ſucking in the aire of that City they breathed *divinitatem*, righteouſneſſe; ſo from the overflow of this place, all parts of the kingdom are full of knowledge, I wiſh I could ſay of *Religion* and *Piety*: Behold a greater then *Socrates* is here: even God himſelfe in his ordinances; we are wet with the influence and dew of heaven, as *Gedeons ſleece*, though all the region about be dry in compariſon; and againe when all about us are wet with the waters of affliction, we are dry and free: we are in the land that floweth with milke and hony: and though it were but a wilderneſſe otherwiſe, yet *God raining Mannah from heaven the food of Angels*, in that reſpect it were a mappe of heaven: we ſit under our vines every man, and under our figtrees: and are planted in *Paradiſe* neere the tree of life, plainly, we enjoy all bleſſed meanes for the knowledge of the way to Salvation in the practiſall ſtudy of Divinity: and of that knowledge which was ſo dainty heretofore we have Gods plenty:

CHAP. I.

Silver is like dust, and gold like stones in our streets, the most pretious treasures of divine wisdom and understanding are open unto us: And have we not as good cause to thanke God as *Plato* had? The *Queen of Sheba* came from the South to heare the wisdom of *Solomon*, and accounted his men happy, and those his servants happy that stood ever before him and heard it: Behold a greater then *Solomon* is here even the Spirit of God, teaching us in the doctrine of Divinity, the way of life and happinesse: Blessed are your eyes that see and your eares that heare these things: Ye blessed be God that hath given us these meanes and opportunities: *Deus nobis hæc omnia fecit.*

But I passe to the second exhortation which shall be to the diligent study of this Doctrine and use of the meanes thereto: because there I shall lay open better the grounds of our thankfulness, and withall keep my selfe closer to the matter in hand: Now we may be provoked to alacrity and diligence in this study from some considerations out of the definitions: the summe of all which is the excellency of this doctrine above others which may appear in three particulars.

First, the Certainty of the truths contained in it from the manner of the conveyance of them to us which I told you was by Divine Revelation.

Second, the Nobility of the object which as
this

this Art is usually and wisely handled, is God and divine things.

Third, the *necessity of the end*, which is *mans happinesse*, or *Salvation*: a word of each of these and so I will conclude.

First, of the *Certainty of the truths*: whereas all other Arts, the skill of which we are to attaine unto by naturall reason upon observation and experience are so uncertain for the most part that a man when he hath done his best may remaine a Sceptick or Academick: by reason of the weaknes of our understanding, proceeding from the wound of originall sin; it is not so with this where we receive all our light and information from God himself, who being the fountaine of wisdom not subject to the least ignorance, and the Ocean of goodnesse far from all malice can neither deceive nor be deceived; and therefore the light of our knowledge being derived from his light, *in lumine illius videmus lumen*, is pure from all darknesse and eclipse of error: and as among all the delight that Mathematicks afford to the students of them, the evidence and certainty of the truths, is one great part of the witchcraft, which makes them dote with love upon them: so I do see no reason why in this the same convenience should not be an effectuall argument to incourage us to digest the labours of our calling with much alacrity and cheerefulness,

Second,

CHAP. I.

Second, for the *Nobility of the object*, *God and divine things*, if the Poets thought so highly of the study of Astronomy, because it is occupied about the Spheares and stars and celestially bodies, that he pronounceth the first authors thereof and professors happy:

*Felices animæ quibus hæc cognoscere primum,
Inque domos superas scandere cura fuit.*

Then how happy are those that are busied in the contemplation of God himselfe, who made the heaven and stars and all, for it is not onely true which the father said, *facilius invenit syderum conditorem humilis pietas, quam syderum conditionem superba curiositas*, not only *facilius*, but I am sure much more *felicior*: this is the chiefe happineffe (in an higher degree then here we do) which we look for in heaven as all the Schoolemen determine, *ἐν τέττα μάλιστα ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ ἁγίου* saith Nazianzen: this is an Angelical office, for I say unto you, their Angels behold the face of their heavenly father continually sayth our Saviour.

Third, for the *necessity of the end* which is that *one thing that is necessary* eternall life and happines: we read in the 19. *Acts*. That of those that believed many which used curious Arts *magicks*, brought their books and burnt them before all men, and they counted the price of them, and found it fifty thousand peeces of silver, all other Arts and books in comparison of this are

are but superfluous and curious : this is *that one thing that is necessary* : and if all were either burnt as they did, or banisht as *Lycurgus* did all unnecessary trades out of *Sparta*, that they might be the more unnecessary, that wee might more excell in this, the matter would not be so great.

Fourth, I might adde to this the *Antiquity*, and use no other probation for it then the last commendation : for as *Peter Martyr* hath well observed, as the Athenians proved themselves the most ancient people, because the invention of corn, that most necessary helpe for the life of man proceeded from them, so that Doctrine must needs be most ancient, which hath the bread of life, and is therefore most necessary.

Fifth, I might commend it from the *Author* which I touched in the 1 condition, *God himself*: which makes much to inflame our affections toward it: for who would be ashamed to be *Gods Scholler*? Or who would not rather think himself highly honored? When *Moses* had talked with *God in the mount*, his face shined : and shall not the Doctrine of *Gods* own mouth, make their face shine whom *God* vouchsafeth to instruct in it.

Wherefore ô yee Prophets sons, cast off all impediments, and let no other imployment hinder your alacrity in this study : consider the excellency of this Science, and know

CHAP. I.

the time of your visitation : while the Sun of prosperity shineth, labor while the harvest of the Gospell lasteth, gather the sheaves unto the barn that winter find not you unprovided:

Σείρησι' αμαρτο δειται τι φραγματι μη παρωσι τις

Εἴποι συκινὰ ἀδύσαι ἀπώλετο κ' οὐκ ὁ μὲν ὁ.

When the Emperor passing through *Jury*, beheld the Land a goodly land, but without culture and tillage through the laziness of the people, he cried out; *O marcomanni, ὁ Sarmatae, ὁ Quadi &c.* O lazy Germans, I have found a people more lazy then you : take heed this be not said of you, that *Themistocles* said of them; *μαχόμεν' ἔχουσιν καρπὸν δι' οὐκ ἔχουσιν*: that foole hath a price in his hand, but he hath no heart to use it.

First, be diligent therefore in reading the word of God, say with *David*, thy word O Lord is more sweet unto me than hony, and more pretious than gold; *Desiderabilia super aurum pretiosum multum*, as the old translation hath it in the 19. Psalm *aut multum aurum aut multum pretiosum*, aut multum desiderabilia sunt multum hoc hereticoparum, as *Austin* glosses upon the variety of the construction.

Second, Be diligent in hearing the word of God: let every word be pretious unto thee, and let not one of them fall to the ground. O how rich, how soon would this divine husbandry make us:

Third, Be diligent in prayer: the father said

said he got more by Prayer than by study, 'tis most true in this Art: if thou want *wisdom*, saith *James*, ask it of God: the secret of the Lord is with them that feare him, saith the Psalmist: this knowledge is better gotten by praying to God, then prying into Schoolemen:

And to conclude, alway remember that this is a Practicall Art, and requires not knowing but doing: bare and naked speculation is the tree of knowledge, that bears nothing but the apple of strife betweene us, and God, and death: Practise, Practise is the tree of Life.

CHAP. II.

The Distribution of Divinity.

HAVING already dispatched the definition of Divinity, with such incident observations as I thought fittest to raise from thence, the threed of method leads me by the hand to the distribution therof, to which I think I may not unfitly accommodate that comon Maxim of Machiavellian policy, *Divide & Regna*, di-

CHAP. 2.

vide and rule and say to the best Divines, not abusing it, but alluding to it, *Divide & Regna*, divide Divinity, and be King of Divines: divide it and I will warrant you Master of your Art: these knots of divisions, are *modi Gordiani*, that portend an Empire, as you heard in another case: this Argument of Distribution is *λογος διειρητικός*, the Royall Argument as *Plato* calls it, professing also that if he could meet with such a Captaine or leader that had the skill of dividing aright, he would follow him as some God: and for this Art especially I would think my selfe happy to be his companion: my purpose was to have represented unto you a view, a Synopsis of Theology and to have taken some more then common paines in the contriving thereof by reason of the excellent use it might have yeilded, and the great variety which you shall finde among authors: and withall to have examined some of the most received forms, where I judge them defective: for the maine I continue still in the same mind, but I shall not do it so fully as I thought.

First, because of the *difficulty*, it being the highest pitch and last point of all in an art, to digest the precepts and parts into method, and supposing an exact inquisition and certain determination of all particular truths, as you know out of Logick: but for my selfe I confesse I am but a Scholler to search, not a Doctor

ctor to teach authentically: *vidator*, not *com-
prehensor* that I may allude to the Schoole di-
stinction:

Second, because of the inconvenience: for
if I did so, I should be forced to hold you too
long in a Scholasticall and artificiall discourse
of notions, which I have done too much al-
ready, and desire now to proceed to things
rather substantiall and more profitable, if not
for instruction of knowledge at least for di-
rection of practice. And therefore I will con-
tract my meditations and draw them into as
narrow a compasse as I can: propounding
only two of the most usuall manner of procee-
ding out of infinite variety, and onely pro-
pounding them without any strict search
made into them; and then commending a
third and new (for mine owne exercise and
yours in this inquiry) to your better consi-
deration: because being now in the entrance
of this Art, and so in the highest and most ge-
nerall, I thinke this the fittest place for such
a prospect, which may subject to your eyes the
particulars: but very briefly because I would
not seeme to lodge you like strangers over the
porth or entry, but like *the household of Faith*,
Domestici fidei, as the Apostle calls them, and
of Divinity likewise, in the inner and more
remote roomes, according to the cu-
stome of the Ancient, which you shall
observe in *Homer* were strangers, are *ἐξοικιστὶς*

CHAP. 2.

ieserum, but the householders
 v. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

The first that I mention shall be that of M. Perkins, and Tilenus, and Sobninus, and other learned Divines, who divide Theology into two parts :

The first of which treats *de Deo*,

The second, *de actionibus Dei*, which they prosecute proportionably in the particulars, Which I will passe over that I may keepe my promised brevity, and the rather because it is easie for you to be fully informed of them : and that I may not stand to examine this accurately ; I thinke you may know my judgement concerning it sufficiently, out of that which I said in the definition, explaining whether and by what right God may come to be handled in Divinity : where I shewed that in the method of Art he was not, but in the method of Prudence he might profitably, which ground there laid being now granted, this Distribution will fall to the ground of it selfe without any more a do.

This observation onely I will now adde, that though that division be not according to the rule of Art, yet many actions of God indeed come to be considered in this Doctrine, namely, such as, without which man cannot attaine to his last end and happines, to which this rule guides : for there are some immediate actions of God, as for example *Redempti-*

on, and all the actions even of man, are in some sort actions of God being performed by the help of his Spirit and assistance of his grace, without which they cannot be performed: inasmuch that *Durands* puts this for an objection that Divinity is not a practicall Art because these actions are not wholly ours, nor in our power alone to perform: and in this sense I deny not, but the actions of God are handled in Divinity so far as they tend to mans happineffe: but this helps that distribution but a little.

First, because that comprehends under it the nature of God and attributes, which make the first part, not only his actions.

Secondly, because it extends it selfe to other actions beside those that conferre to the fornamed scope of mans happines, both which respects shew it to bee of too much generality,

And thridly, therefore that which belongs properly to this doctrine is but a small portion in that distribution, and those actions of God which are necessary may well be ranked under another order: many other exceptions I might bring against that division if it would stand with my purpose, but I omit them both for that reason, and because they shall better appeare out of that which follows.

The second that I will name, shall be that which *Arms*, as I think, first observed, and

Polanus

Polanus after him hath much confirmed, and many modern divines approve and follow, which makes two parts of Theology,

First, of Faith *de fide*.

Second, *de fidei operibus* of good works, the first *de credendis*, the second *de faciendis*, and so forward in all the subdivisions: and this I confesse I thought absolute a long time both for the commendation of good authors, as also for the consanguinity with the Scripture and congruity with Reason, till that upon better consideration I found it did not satisfy me.

For first, beside the ambiguity of the word *fides* which cannot be avoided if it be taken in that infinite extent to comprehend so much and so divers things in it as it must of necessity according to that distribution, all which cannot possibly be conceived to agree in one univocall predication or formall respect, as I might easily demonstrate: but are brought under it, not without apparent force and violence.

And secondly, beside the seeming agreement of the parts one with another against the nature and rule of a distribution which requires they should be opposite, which though it may be well answered, yet in my opinion were better avoided: for it sounds harsh and seems unreasonable that one part should treat of the habit another of the act of faith: and
whereas

whereas it may be said for that, that the meaning of it is not to oppose and sever the habit of faith from the formall effects of it, for that would be absurd indeed: but by *opera fidei* you must understand other graces and virtues, so that the opposition stands between the habit of *faith*, and the habit of *other graces and virtues* which are therefore called the *works of faith*, or *effects*, because beside their owne proper habits from whence they proceed *formaliter*, they must and doe also in some sort flow from faith, and from it they have all their commendation and acceptation with God, being without it but *splendida peccata*, as you all have heard out of *Austin* often: for *without faith it is impossible to please God*, saith the Apostle *Paul*: but this is not enough if to excuse it, yet not to justify it.

First, because the terms are so ambiguous that they give too much occasion to mistakes and stumbling, as I said before.

Secondly, because in sanctification, which they that propound this distribution range under faith, the habits of all other graces and virtues are infused, and so included as well as of Faith.

Thirdly, because in the Decalogue, the rule of obedience and good works, and consequently a principall portion of the second part, faith is also included or else other worse inconveniences will follow: and so there is a

K

mutu-

CHAP. 2.

mutuall *intermixtions*, and immeation in these parts, as Divines speake in another case, which cannot be without a strange and wonderfull confusion : in which regard I cannot see that these parts are artificially and accurately cut out : but beside that which hath been alledged I could produce many more exceptions which I omit rather : and in both these I would be thus understood, not as rejecting either as unprofitable : for I approve them both as very good though not exact : and stand not much upon formalities of Art, so as they comprehend in them the substance of Theologicall truths: preferring this before the other as I would preferre a peece of gold for weight rather then for workmanship, for value rather then for elegancy, like that French coyne in the historian that in *qua plus forma quam ponderis*. And now give me leave to commend a third a new form of this Art to your consideration with two cautions.

First, I do not think that I can see further, or go beyond those ancient Heroes in Divinity, who were so richly furnished with understanding, which they so thriftily improved by incomparable paines and industry : that is far from my meaning, but only as I said, to exercise my selfe and you in this inquiry : and yet ye know what the Philosopher saith, that there is an *irridens*, an increase and growth in all Arts : And the common saying is *discipu-*

Two est prioris posterior dies : Day unto day increaseth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge, saith the Psalmist : and though a Gyant be taller then a Pygme, yet a Pygme upon his shoulders hath advantage of him, though ancient surpasse modern times, yet we ploughing with their heifer may understand their secrets, and with their helpe may outstrip them : in a word it is with the light of knowledge, as with the lamps at the games in Athens, one generation carries it as far as it can, and after it, doth tradere lampada, to the succeeding generation, which runs along further with it.

Secondly, I do not imagine that which I am to propound absolute, though comparatively I prefer it, or produce it rather either to give some further light to these dark passages, or at least some illustration to that which hath been said already by others :

Thirdly, though for the generall I hope I shall insist in the right way, yet for the particulars I do not intend them, as full or accurate, neither much lesse will I contend they are so : for I could not hope to satisfie my self in them on the sodaine, and therefore content my selfe to propound them, *αρχαῖς*, as the Philosopher speaks.

Now that I may proceed according to the nature of method, which deduceth one axiom one precept out of another : for it is there as

CHAP. 2.

you see it in spinning, the lock of wool is first fastned upon the spindle, and out of that the threed is drawn in a long series, and then an hint of that is left to which the next is fastned, till all be done in like manner: so in an Art, first, the Definition is laid down, out of which must be spun, and drawn all the succeeding precepts: and thus I will do with this: the Definition then you may remember to have been this.

Divinity is a Doctrine of mans happinesse: there be two words which note the *subjectum formale*, *Happinesse*; and the *subjectum materiale*, *Man*; and according to these two, I frame the *Distribution* thus:

First, of *Happines* simply considered.

Secondly, of *Happines* in the *Subject*.

First, of *Happines* in generall.

Secondly, of *Happines* in particular, according to the divers states of it *in relation to the Subject*: to illustrate this I will put you in minde of three other distributions which harpe upon this, though they doe not fully agree.

The first is of some that considering Divinity to be *medicina animarum*, borrow termes from the Physick of the body which they accommodate to this, and part it proportionably into *medicinal*, of mans misery by nature, and *recovery*, of his recovery by Christ, from which the common method in *Visu* differs but

but little: this supposeth mans fall or begins with it; and therefore I think either omitteth something necessary, or else incurreth a necessary confusion of those things which would better be more distinctly handled.

The second I find in a learned Author *Estius* in his preface upon the sentences, who divides it into *Theologia prima*, that treats of man in his first estate of integrity, and *Theologia secunda*, that considers him after his fall, as to be guided to his happines; and this comes a degree neerer to that I propounded than the former, because it mentions both estates and handles them, and yet it seemes short by one degree.

The third comes up yet closer, and you shall find it in *Trelocatius*, who divides Divinity thus: there be two parts.

First, *de causis salutis nostrae eoque de Dei operibus.*

Secondly, *de Subiecto illius id est Homine, varioque Hominis statu:* and explaining the ground of this distribution in the next words, he speakes for my purpose more directly: *Salus enim (saith he) quae Theologia finis proximus est, duobus modis consideratur, tum in se & causis suis simpliciter, tum Relate ad Subiectum ad quod ordinata est, quae ratione varietate modificatur, pro conditione Subiecti multiplici in quo est:* where ye see ye have the same distribution of that I gave, and in the same forma-

CHAP. 2.

lity of termes almost equal, and this superadds a degree to the former which I think is necessary.

The first takes *man* as he is now *fallen*, and so applies meanes for recovery of his happiness:

The second considers, both of his *standing* first, and then his *fall*.

This third abstracts, what is common to both estates, what is the common *nature of his happiness*, and so descends to the particular accommodation thereof, according to the difference of his condition: and this I think is full enough and large in extent, to comprehend all things that this Doctrine is to meddle with: and I will use no other reason to prove it, because I think it carries some evidence of truth or at least probability with it, especially supposing the grounds formerly laid, but only that it is drawn out of the definition with such facility, that it appears to be a naturall distribution: the doctrine of mans happiness hath two parts.

First of *Happiness in it selfe in generall*.

Secondly, of *mans happiness*, in reference to the proper subject: and now I proceed to some few principall subdivisions to give you a view and *synopsis* of the whole Art.

Happiness in generall hath two things in it to be considered.

First, the *parts or degrees*, or affections, for

I desire you to remember that I am not curious for termes.

Secondly, the *kinds of happinesse*: the parts or degrees are two.

First, the *Constitution of it*, or *Habitual happinesse*.

Secondly, the *Continuation of it*, or *Actual happinesse*: the former I briefly touched the last time; the latter I conceive to consist in two things especially.

First, the gracious *Administration of all things without a man by God, in ordine ad felicitatem*: for it is impossible that man should *nasare sine cortice*, and attaine to his own *suo marti*, by his own endeavors, without Gods providence supporting him, and suggesting all necessities to him, there being the same proportion between him and God in this case that there is between inferior creatures and man: and therefore as it is in architecture and such like Arts, which in regard of the naturall aptitude of the subject may be speculative, but in regard of the Artificer, whose actions must passe upon it to bring their *potentia* to *actus*, their possibilities to perfection, are Practicall: so or not much unlike in divinity, it is Practicall most in regard of God: as I noted in part before.

The second thing, for the *continuation of Happiness*, the *virtuous and religious operation of man*; which by the helpe of the former the

the *grace of God* : he is able to produce, in which respect *Divinity* is also properly Practicall on mans part, as hath been said; these are the two things which I call the continuation or the *fluxus* of happines, the *Operation of Gods grace toward man*, and the *grace of mans Operation toward God* : for habituall happinesse standing most, as I said, in the *relation reciprocall of God to man* being his God, and *man to God* being his servant, the *desires* and act of it must needs be placed in the reflexion of mutuall offices of love, according to the peculiar condition of either : And now follow the kinds of happinesse, which are two.

First, of *this life*;

Second, of *the life to come*: in the former according to that which hath been said there be two things.

First *Constitution*, which is in a certaine degree of our *union with God*, and consequently fruition of all good, far inferior to the second estate which is future :

Secondly, the *Continuation*, which is,

First by the *gracions providence of God*, supplying all things necessary for such an estate, and enabling us to action agreeing to his will.

Secondly, our *Religious action* being thus enabled, which is of two sorts.

First, our *generall worship of God*.

Secondly, our *speciall* : the generall worship

ship of God is in the observation and of his will and gracious covenant which he pleases to make with man: where two things are to be noted.

First, *Substance of the Covenant.*

Secondly, the *Scales*: the Substance in two things.

First, to *love and honor God* above all things for himselfe.

Secondly, to *love other things* respectively in *subordination to God*: and in these three are divers particulars, but I must leave them here.

The *Scales of the Covenant* are sensible things, applyed according to the condition of mans nature, who is both *intellectuall* and *sensitive*; the use of which according to Gods institution should both confirme the promises on Gods part, and as it were ingage him to performance, and confirme man in his duty, and as it were oblige him more to the performance of it: the speciall worship of God is in *prayer*, *thanksgiving*, *praising* of his glorious name, and the like: and this is *the happines of this life*: the happines of the life to come is that state which God is pleased voluntarily and freely to promise to man; where be two things likewise.

First, the *Constitution*, which far surpasseth the former, man being to be elevated above himselfe in supernaturall perfections.

L

Se-

Secondly, the *Continuation*, first, in Gods singular and immutable Grace, secondly, by the operations of man, more noble and proportionable to such a glorious estate: and (which I should have mentioned before) these two are subordinate, the former to the latter: insomuch that this is called happines by appropriation and excellency; the other, but the way and means to this Happines among the most of our Divines. And all these come to be handled in the first part of Divinity concerning *Happines* in generall, because they belong indifferently to man in all estates: out of which the second part with some inflexion, may be easily conceived: and therefore I come to that:

The second part of Divinity is concerning *Happines in speciall*, in reference to the subject, *Man*; who must be considered.

First, in the *state of integrity*.

Secondly, in the state of the *fall and corruption*: in integrity,

First, the *constitution of his happinesse*, was (in one word) the *Image of God*.

Secondly, the *continuation*.

First, in Gods grace giving all things meet, for upholding that estate.

Secondly, *mans observance* in the worship of God, first generall, secondly speciall.

First, Generall for the covenant, first the *Substance* as it was.

First,

First, *Morall* in these two things, first to love God above all as a creator, secondly, all other subordinately.

Secondly, *Ceremoniall*, abstaining from the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evill, secondly for the Seale of the Covenant, which was then the tree of life.

Secondly, for *speciall worship* it was prayer &c, the propriety of which was, that it might be, without a mediator:

Secondly, the Future life was an elevation above that naturall estate to a better, but inferior to that we look for in Christ: and this for the first estate of integrity:

The second for the *Fall*, in regard of the present life is mixt and worse then the former: and first for substance is the same alway, secondly, for circumstance different:

The *substance* first for *constitution* must be bestowed wholly by God, and that by a double act, first of *Redemption* by the Sonne, secondly of *Sanctification* by the Spirit.

Secondly, the *continuation*, first by the grace of God, in Christ, secondly by the *actions of man* guided by the Spirit: which are,

First, *Observation of the new covenant* in a mediator, whereof first, the *substance* is in two things, first to love God above all things in Christ, 2. *all other things for Christ*, secondly the *Seales* are all representative of Christ: and secondly *Prayer* to be put up in the *name of*

Christ our mediator: and this is the substance, the summe.

But secondly, this is *varied in circumstance, of Christ*; first *promised*, secondly *performed*, where the chiefe difference is in regard of the outward parts of the Sacraments, and the ceremonies: and this is the state of this present life: the future life is not onely passing the present, but also that future which *Adam* should have been exalted to in the state of integrity, as Divines think, because in it concur both the *free gift of God*, willing to advance us, and the *merit of Christ* purchasing it, and a congruity that the humane nature being advanced to the incomparable dignity of the hypostaticall union in *Christ* the head, should bee proportionably dignified in the whole kinde.

I know I must looke for many objections which I should incounter withall concerning the order of the generall, and the insufficiency of the particulars: but *I* will not incomber my selfe and you with a long answer; only in briebe *I* say,

First, if the generall mold and frame be convenient, that is as much as *I* aime at, the particular passages *I* stand not much upon,

Secondly, it is no wonder if many Theologicall things may seem to be wanting; for my purpose was to touch only *summa rerum fastigia*, not to descend to all inferior parts.

Thirdly

Thirdly, you must remember there may be a great difference between Divinity, as it is usually handled, and as it should be exactly; between the method of prudence and the method of Art: the latter *I* would willingly find, because it keepeth closest to the nature of the Object to be regulated: the former notwithstanding *I* will be content to follow, and *I* thinke is best absolutely, all things considered, as *I* am sure it is more usuall and more usefull: and among all those methods, as *I* easily dislike none, especially those two that *I* mentioned in the beginning: so *I* most approve that of *Trelocatius* which premiseth two principles.

First, *Cognitionis, the Scriptures.*

Secondly, *Res* which is *God*: and then proceeds to the parts, because it comes neereſt to the accurate method in generall: though in many particulars *I* prefer either of the other two before it. *I* will now in a word commend unto you the use of that which ye have heard, from whence you shall perceive my scope in this delineation: *I* confesse *I* have done it so rudely and rawly; that it may bee rather a meanes to breed a loathing, than a liking of Divinity: as *Socrates* to beat down the pride of *Alcibiades* (as *Ælian* tels the story) which the opinion of his great possessions had bred in him, shewing him a map of Greece, bid him find out his land if he could, but when hee

CHAP. 2.

could not, said thus to him, and are not you ashamed then, to be proud of those lands, *et uisus pinguis ystria* : so may some man thinke the worse of the rich possession of Divinity, because in the little map that I have drawn many parcels are not to be found, and as *Tully* sayth of hangings, or such like, so long as they are folded together and wraped, there is no sight of them, nothing that may draw liking or wonder : so long as these Divine truths are folded and plighted together in these few divisions, there is no lustre or light sparkles from them, that may inflame the beholder with love towards them; but if they were opened and displayed *mirabiles amores excitarent sui* : yet my purpose was, because I cannot go through all, at least to give you a light a far off; as the tempter led our Savior into an high mountaine whence he shewed him all the Kingdomes of the earth, the glory of which might intice him; so have I presented you a view of all divinity to incite you to a love and study of them : But why do I use such a comparison : rather as the Lord caried *Moses* into mount *Nebo*, whence he saw the holy land though he could not enter into it: so because I cannot lead you into the possession of this holy land, I have at least lent you a prospect of it : I might out of all the particulars single out some more excellent peaces to kindle your affections, but I must omit it: and

end

end with this counsell, that every one that intends the study of Divinity, would endeavor to get and hold ~~some convenient place~~ as Paul advertiseth Timothy, a form of *wholsome words*, for the singular utility that it will bring to him: first in regard of his memory, which is wonderfully helped by this, as you al know, though I spare to tell you: both out of your first principles of Art, as also by experience: And he that carries about with him in his head a frame of Divinity, shall have a safe treasury, where to repose all scattered and loose notions that he heares or reads, the severall branches of it shall be like so many borders of herbs, so many beds of flowers, so many boxes of spices, in which he may meet with them againe upon all occasions.

Secondly, in regard of *Judgement* which is much strengthened and backed by this: for this will furnish him with the most principall things of the Art, which he shall behold under one, so that he may compare them together and examine them at his pleasure: and as in a map a man may see places how they are situat for North and South or the like, and what distance there is from place to place, may easily be measured: so in such a frame, or ripe, a man may behold what agreement or distance there is between one thing and another in Divinity: how one thing borders upon another &c. without any difficulty, and this reduced

CHAP. 2.

to use will appeare better either in a contro-
versie, which will receive much light, the
doubtfull truth being reduced to his proper
seat, and there examined and decided by some
infallible truths: and so in the explication of
a place of Scripture according as a man hath
made a platforme of Divinity familiar to him,
so will he expedite himselfe better or worse
according as it is: for it will direct him how
to conceive of a trope or proper signification
of a word; and so in other cases.

Thirdly, and lastly for *invention*, this will
furnish him with an inexhaust treasury of
matter springing from the conference of one
portion with another; but will be most be-
neficiall, for the discovery of two arguments
most necessary, the *Genera*. I meane, which
will appeare out of the *Series*, and the Defi-
nitions which will be as succinct and perspi-
cuous in such an order, as you see they are ob-
scure and tedious without it: a *Divine* with-
out this cannot chuse but have all his know-
ledge snared and intangled, as if he were in
a labyrinth without a clue.



Of the Happinesse of M A N.

CHAP. III.

MY purpose was, according to the method that is commonly received and practised among the best Artists in the delivery of Arts, immediately after the definition of Divinity explained, to have proceeded to the distribution: because I desire to make haste out of these Scholasticall and notionall truths, to such things as may be more practicall and profitable: but the time approching, and the duties to be then performed by us, putting me in mind, I will alter my course a little, and direct my speech so, that if it be not every way suitable, which my generall project would not permit, yet I hope it shall not be altogether unseasonable: though it concerne not the receiving of the Sacrament in particular, yet it shall in generall concerne matters of practise and use: though it direct not receivers in a peculiar manner, yet it shall not stand Sholars only in hand (as perhaps the other doth) but every Christian in their measure to know and doe: for I meane to speake of the *Happines of*

M

man,

CHAP. 3.

man, wherein it consists: and though I intended to have interposed the distribution and Synopsis of Divinity between the definition and this, as I said, yet as he in *Plutarch* said more prittily then piously, when he threw at a dog, but hit his stepmother, *κρίνομεθα* so I may say: for if I had continued in my first resolution for my method, I should have gone forth by the footsteps of the flocke, and fed my kids, by the tents of other shepheards, as our Saviour counsels his Spouse, in the first of the Canticles, I should not have straid a whit out of the common road: but as I have now altered it, I think I shall gaine this advantage, to go the neereſt way, according to the exact preſcript of Art; for by the ſame reaſon that I thought it probable, before that the diſtribution of art in generall ariſes from the Object, it being in it ſelf ſpecially indiviſible, & the multiplication of precepts in the ſame Art ariſes from the multiplicity and variety of the ſeverall branches of ſome particular object: I think it will follow by good conſequence, that the Diſtribution of an Art will follow the diſtribution of his object: the Art it ſelfe being divided, but by accident in reference to the object, with which it goes along: even as Logick would be perhaps not more truly, becauſe the matter is the ſame, but more truly (as we ſay) in formality, be ordered thus, if it were defined *Dialeſtica eſt Ars rationis: Ratio eſt*

est simplex vel Composita, so that you should understand the object primarily to beare the division, which should notwithstanding secondarily redound to the Art it selfe, with which that is linked in so neer a conjunction: but thus much by the way, onely upon occasion of the alteration of that method, which I first propounded to my self: I come now to the point, I meane to prosequete, namely concerning the *Happinesse of man*: wherein, that I may proceed with least offence and most expedition,

I will first *premise* some few observations unfolding the ambiguities of some terms, that occur in this argument, and may otherwise breed some obscurity in the matter:

And then secondly, I will deliver the principall things to be known, in two conclusions or assertions: for the first I will name three onely, and that very briefly.

First, *Summum bonum*, may be taken two wayes.

First, for *Bonum prestantissimum* and *singulare*, which excels and surpasses all other in comparison, and that is some one particular good, which is exalted above his fellows, to the highest degree of eminency.

Secondly, for *Bonum integrum* or *universale* which is a collection of all the particulars, comprehended under the Spheare or latitude of *bonum*, and therefore called *summum*, be-

CHAP. 3.

cause all being ranked according to methods heraldry, that sits in the highest place, that justly challenges the precedency: to accommodate this to our present purpose, in the first acceptation, God is said, and most truly to be *summum bonum*, for to whom *will see liken mee*, saith the Lord in the Prophet, or what may compare with God, as it is in the Psalm: but in the second meaning it is not so, neither is it any one particular that can claime that name, but it is a confluence and concurrence of all together that makes *summum bonum*: the use of this distinction shall appeare by and by.

Secondly, you must distinguish between *Summum Bonum* taken in either of the former senses, and *Beatitudo*, as *Polanus* doth: the former consideration is of good things, barely & absolutely, as so in themselves, the latter beside that, is respective and includes an habitude in which they stand to man, who injoies them: or as the Schoolemen have it, in other words there is a double *beatitudo*, *objectiva*, the same that *summū*, and that is God, as it is taken for *praesentissimū*, or a collection of all, in a word, *humanum bonum*, according to the other signification, and secondly *formalis*, the same that I cal'd *beatitudo* in propriety, as distinct from *summum bonum*, and that is, either that operation by which we have union with the *summum bonum* and injoy it, as they say commonly,

monly, or that habit or state as I rather think from whence a man hath the denomination of Happinesse, or both, for both of necessity must be conceived.

Thirdly, you must observe a triple latitude in the signification of this word *Happines*.

First, in the largest sense, the fruition of any good, being a portion of it, doth also get the name of *happinesse*, and he is at large an happy man, who injoyes any such particular good, and so we use to say occasionally, hearing of any good befalls any man, he is an happy man, so far namely as that will extend, for otherwise the same man may want many things, and be simply to say, very miserable.

Secondly, in the strictest sense that is *happinesse* only that arises from a confluence of all humane good, and he onely deserves the name in whom they all meet and are married; and thus no man upon earth, is or shall bee happy.

Thirdly, in a middle sense, that is *happines* where the fruition of good, though not free from all mixture of evill; yet is so prevalent & predominant, that it may justly denominate a man happy simply, though not simply happy in all respects, and that man is happy where this is to be found: this last you may call out of the Schoolmen *essentiall happinesse and true*, the second *integrall and compleat happinesse*, the third for distinctions sake if you will, *partiall*

CHAP 3.

tiall and incompleat Happinesse : I might add something also of true and false happinesse, sound and supposed, but the homonymie is so palpable that I shall not need, and therefore will content my selfe with that which hath been said already of the first point, reserving other things that may seeme to be of moment and consequence to their proper oportunities : and passe now to the second part I promised, which was to shew, what happines is, and wherein it consists in two conclusions, and that according to the two stricter acceptions of the word even now mentioned.

The first shall declare what *integrall and compleat happinesse* is, and wherein it consists.

The second what *true and essentiall happinesse* is, and wherein it consists : the first I will dispatch briefly meaning to insist most upon the latter.

Compleat happinesse, I call that where nothing is defective, and you may conceive it, I think tolerably, by such a discription or a like. *Happinesse is a perfect estate of a reasonable nature wherein it injoys all good that is due unto it.*

I describe it by *estate* rather then *Operation*, because no operation doth denominate the efficient, but happines doth the subject : again every operation is transient, and in a continuall flux, but happinesse seemes to be something

thing permanent : and thirdly operation doth never perfectly exist : but happines doth otherwise, that of *Solon* should be true which the Philosopher rejects , *Ante obitum nemo supremaque funera felix*: and a man should not be happy till he were not at all.

Secondly I adde a *perfect state*, which needs no further explication.

Thirdly, I say of a *reasonable creature*: because as *Scaliger* well taxes *Cardan* , for attributing *vitam beatam* in such a *qua sane ex optimo purissimoque loquendi genere soli debetur homini*: and if the meaning be, because nothing is wanting to it, *non improbe sentit sed plusquam improbe loquitur*: for that reason is no sufficient appellation or warrant for that, for if we would *deglubere significationem*, as he speaks in that manner, by the same ambitious superstition we might call an element happy, because it is in his own place, which would be *auge sed exagium*, though we read in *Xenophon* *οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον*, by a trope improperly so stiled: but whereas, as *Scaliger* seemes to appropriat happinesse to a man, I think that is not right, neither is it his purpose so to re-straine it, for an Angel may be happy even in propriety of language : and therefore speaking in generall I extend it as far as it goes to all reasonable creatures, though I intend the particular application and use to man only now follows the other part of the description which

CHAP. 3.

which saith it is such an estate of the reasonable creature, wherein it enjoys all that good which is due unto it. And this perhaps might have sufficed alone to have described *Happinesse* to have been the fruition of all good due to man, though the other make it more plaine and full; where,

First, by *good* that is due, I meane not by any necessary bond or obligation in which God is tyed to the creature to give it, but that which hath proportion unto and congruity with the nature of man, and to which therefore man hath a naturall aptitude and appetite or propension.

Secondly, by *all good* I say, because man being a compound creature must have a compound happines of many ingredients, because the perfection of the whole must result from the perfection of every part; and you may digest them thus: the good is either *Summum* which is God, as I said; or *Subordinatum*, and this again is either *internum* within the essence of a man; or *externum* without him: *Internum* is either *Bonum Corporis* or *Bonum Animæ*: *bonum Animæ* is either *Intellectus* or *Voluntatis*; or if you had rather rake them without this curiosity of Art, they are five.

First, God and his favor, as the supream Lord.

Secondly, *Reason*, right and conformable to God.

Thirdly

Thirdly, a *will* in tune and conformable to right reason.

Fourthly, a *body* in good temper and disposition serviceable to a will tuned.

Fifthly, *outward blessings* answerable to all the rest: these make the spheare and circle of good; which, upon whose head soever they fall, doe crowne him with compleat and perfect happines: which, because of my propounded brevity, it shall suffice to have made an enumeration of, without illustration.

Thirdly, for *fruition* I may conveniently and proportionably name five degrees of it: though perhaps every one of them shall not be judged exactly necessary.

First, *possession* and usurpation or use of those good (for I joyn those two together) because perhaps they cannot alway be well distinguished in that respect (they have to happiness) which is for the most part by the action of virtue, secondly, *knowledge* of that possession, and a consideration reflected upon our riches and happines, Thirdly *delight* springing from that knowledge, fourthly *quiet of all parts* filled with that delight and satisfied, fifthly, *security* of that quiet upon *assurance reasonable* of the continuance and perpetuity of that estate and those good: All these where they meet are enough to milk out all the good that can be in them; to suck out all the juice and sweetnesse, all the marrow and

N

fat-

CHAP. 3.

fatnesse that they have : and the name of felicity sometimes imports some one of these, sometime two or more, and the opinions of Philosophers and divines accordingly pitch upon them : but where there is a concurrence of all, I cannot see what should bee wanting : for he that hath such a fruition of all good eternall, internall, externall, in body Soule and whole man, as brings with it a perfect quietation of the naturall appetite joyned with unspeakable delight, and unmoved security (that I may contract all into a narrow roome)

Quis non illum beatum dixerit & non potius beatissimum : I might enlarge these things with illustrations and probations if the matter required, but I think it so perspicuous and evident to any that will consider it, that it would be but lost labour to dwell any longer upon it : especially this being agreeable with that definition which you know is common out of *Boetius*, that *Beatitudo est status bonorum omnium aggregatione perfectus*, and that of *Anselm* *Sufficientia commodorum omnium*, and that of *Austin*, *Beatus est qui habet quicquid vult & nihil mali vult* as they are alleaged by *Gregory de Valentia* : and I thinke it is the common notion that presents it selfe to all men, when they heare that word *Happines*, to think presently upon some universall good : and he that would make an emblem or picture of happinesse, must set it forth like that of Peace
among

among the Ancients with a *cornucopia* an horn of plenty in the hand, or like the picture of *Pan*, with all shapes and infinite variety: and therefore according to my promise and desire I will now proceed to the second assertion which shall explaine what essentiall happinesse is, and wherein it consists: wherein I may be more punctuall, because it will be more properly Theologicall as you shall perceive:

Essentiall *Happines* I understand, which though it want many particulars, which are *de integritate felicitatis*, yet it hath all things that are *de essentia*, and hath enough to salve the name and title of happinesse in truth and propriety: as a man that wants his arms or legs is not *integer homo*; but so long as the *Soule is united to the body* is a man: or, as the name being given according to the predominant part; wine doth not lose the name of wine for a little water mingled with it: so here, though there be some wants and consequently some misery mingled with this happines, yet taking more of happines then misery, it hath the name and nature of happines; and this I call *essentiall Happines*: and this I say must be placed in *God alone* and *our fruition of him* or *union with him*. But to handle this point more fully, as I purpose in the rest hereafter to take some place of Scripture for a ground and foundation to build upon (where it may be done conveniently) so I will doe

CHAP. 3.

here: and that you shall find in the last verse of the 144 Psalm, where ye have these words *Blessed are the people that are in such a case, yea blessed are the people whose God is the Lord:* which as you see, speaks of blessednes, and as I conceive, couch as much of that argument, and for our present scope, as any that I could meet withall: and I am only sorry the time is so short that I shall be forced but to name the things I have to deliver, because I resolve to goe through with this point and dispatch it at this time.

The Psalm as may seeme, was composed in time of war, and is partly spent in a laudatory thanksgiving for successe and victory; *Blessed be the Lord my strength, which teacheth my hands to war and my fingers to fight:* and partly is petitory, containing a suite to God for further safety and deliverance from the proud enemy and war, that the Church might enjoy the blessings of peace. *Bow thy heavens o Lord and come downe, touch the mountaines and they shall smoke: that our sons may be as plants grown up in their youth; that our daughters may be as corner stones polished after the similitude of a palace:* and there having made a Catalogue of the benefits of peace, the Psalmist concludes all with this Epilogue, this sweet and pathetically Epiphonema; *Blessed are the people that are in such a case, yea blessed are the people whose God is the Lord:* which hath two parts, as ye see, like
the

the portion of *Azrah* that *Caleb* gave her, the Springs above and the Springs beneath; like the blessing of *Isaac* divided among his two sons: the blessing of *Esau*, the fatnes of the earth and the dew of heavens shall be thy portion; and the blessing of *Jacob*, the dew of heaven and the fatnes of the earth: the blessings of the left hand, *Blessed are the people that are in such a case*; and the blessings of the right hand, *yea blessed are the people whose God is the Lord*: I must speake something of either; and principally, as applicable to any man single; yet so, that I will sprinkle something as they concerne a nation or people, for which the letter of the text is most direct.

The first point is this, *that outward prosperity and peace is a blessing of God, and confers to our happines*, whether you consider one person or an whole people: you must understand this according to the ordinary distinction in this case, of *per se* & *per accidens*; it is so *per se*, in his owne nature, though we through our sin may *interpolare naturam*, that I may use *Tertullians* phrase of the Divell, in a sense not much different, we may alter nature and make that which is of it selfe helpfull unto us, hurtfull: and thus that truth is evident and cleare.

First, because those outward things have an *aptitude in them* to satisfie mans naturall appetite: for in every man (being a compound nature, the *vinculum* of heaven and earth in

Doctrine.

Reason.

CHAP. 3.

which both are, as it were, married by the conjunction of his soule and body) there is a double man, inward and outward: now this *homo externus*, agrees with that *homo interior*, as well as his inward with the *homo exterior*, as the *Platonicks* speake: and therefore stands in need of outward things both for necessity to sustaine and preserve him, as also for lawfull delight to cheere and refresh him.

Secondly, outward good things are to him both the *subject* and *instruments* of many *virtues*, and so great advantages in his course of godlinesse, both to furnish himselfe, and to helpe and further his brethren, and in both to promote the honor of God in his true worship, and therefore *David*, who was a man of war, *could not build the house of God*, and that *Solomon* his son might, *God gave him rest round about from all his enemies*, and riches in such abundance that gold in his time was like stones in the street, and silver like the dust of the earth, and hence it is,

Thirdly that God is said to give these blessings to his children as *testimonies* of his love and favor, and as *rewards* of their faithfull obedience: he brought the children of *Israel* out of *Egypt* the land of bondage into *Canaan* the land of *promise*, out of the land where they were fed with onions and garlick, into the land that flowed with milk and hony: and wishes pathetically in the 81. Psalm, *O that my people*

ple had barked unto me, and Israel had walked in my wayes, I should soone have subdued their enemyes, and turned my hand against their adversaries; He should have fed them also with the finest of the wheat, and with hony out of the rocke, I should have satisfied them: But why do I go about to prove this since all the world almost is more prone to dote upon these externall blessings, as the only happinesse, rather then to doubt, whether they confer to it at all or no! it was well said that he that cal'd Riches *bona* goods first, was a better husband then divine, but it may be thought that the most are such husbands that enquire *who will shew us any goods*, as though they were the onely good: and therefore I had more need to improve it by making use, then prove it by reason, and a threefold use, offers it selfe to our consideration.

First, *not to fasten our eyes upon the things themselves, but to looke up to heaven and acknowledge God the author of all the good we enjoy*, with humble thankfulness, and thankful humility: *Thou crownest the geere with thy goodnes o Lord and thy steps drop fatnes, 65. Thou preparest a table before me in the presence of my enemyes. Thou anointest my head with oyle my cup runneth over*: the Lord hath given us that health and prosperity, and peace and plenty of all things that we enjoy, *Blessed bee the name of the Lord*: But this not enough but therefore.

Application.

Second-

CHAP. 3.

2. Let us labor to *employ and improve all these blessings*, that he hath so liberally bestowed on us, to the best advantage of his glory : least God complain of us, as of the Jewes once in the Prophet, *That we abuse his corn, and his wine, and his oyle*, I may say, his time and his wit, and his learning, to our unlawfull lusts and lovers : O that now when God hath given us peace from our enemies round about us, while we have meanes, we had also minds to build the Temple of the Lord, to advance the kingdom of our Lord *Jesus Christ* : let us make these externall favors, but looking glasses through which we may behold the beauty of God that gave them; but as ladders *scale creaturatum*, and stairs to climbe up to heaven : though they have a naturall goodnes in themselves, yet they have no morall to us, but in *ordine* to this end without which they are vanity.

Thirdly, if these be good blessings and confer to happinesse, then let us sympathize *with the Saints that want them* ; Let us pray for the peace of *Jerusalem*: Peace be within thy walls, and prosperity within thy pallaces :

And now I come to the second and more principall point, which I thought to have stood most upon, but the time hath prevented me : and therefore I will delineare onely the particulars, and perfect them at some other opportunity ; for the former is not enough :
he

he is not an happy man, whose bones are full of marrow, and his eyes stand out with fatnesse: that swims in pleasure and riches, and shines in purple and scarlet and fares deliciously every day: that lives in a land that flowes with milke and hony, and washes his paths in butter: but who then? *Blessed is the man, the people whose God is the Lord*: the point then is this:

Our chief happines consists in our union, with God and fruition of him: the phrase I think whose God is the Lord imports thus much, they who are in covenant with God, when God accepts some for his people and servants and testifies so much especially by acquainting them with his ordinances, and when reciprocally they acknowledge and embrace him for their God walking in humble obedience to his commandments, so that happines stands.

First, in that *relation between us and God*.

Secondly, is maintained by those *actions mutuall* on either part: and thus the truth may be cleare for these reasons.

First, because *God is the most eminent good of all*, incomparably beyond all other, both severally and joyntly; and therefore the fruition of him is essentiall happines though others be wanting, because there will be more good then evill in such an estate, as that man is rich that hath a pearle suppose of infinite value, worth many thousands though he want many things.

O

Se-

Docrine.

Reason.

Secondly, because God *contains all other things virtually in himselfe*, so that he that hath God hath all, for he alone can and will give all.

Thirdly, because *God alone can supply the want of all the rest*, in the proper effect of Happinesse by himselfe, and all that we would desire to find in them, we may have in him; for a full content and quiet of the mind and satisfying of the whole appetite, is that which we hunt for, and would faine distill, and milk out all the particulars we desire, but this is richly and royally afforded us by God alone: *How excellent is thy loving kindness O God when the children of men put their trust under the shadow of thy wing, they shall be abundantly satisfied with the fatnes of thy house; and thou shalt make them drink of the river of thy pleasure; for with thee is the fountaine of life, in thy light shall we see light.*

The uses of this point may be these,

Application.

First, for confutation of all those fond, and vaine opinions of the vulgar, or of the learned Philosophers about happinesse, some placing it in *pleasure*, some in *honor*, some in *riches*, the most reasonable in *virtue*, which well interpreted hath some truth, we have better learned to place it in the fruition of God.

Secondly, for *reprehension* of the practise of *carnall and worldly men*, that even in the bosom of the Church and Schoole of Christ, are such *non proficients*, that they seek no further, neglecting the communion with God, and following

ing those things with great greedinesse, *tamquam bac siat nostri medicina doloris.*

Thirdly, for instruction of all, *Many say who will serve me any good:* but come hither, and as God said to Moses, *Ostendam tibi omne bonum,* when he gave him but a glimpse of himself, & his glory, god is al good god is perfect happines. For *Exhortation*, there is no man but desires happines: when the juggler undertook to tell every man what he wished for, and delited, and much company was met to see the issue of his promise with great expectation, out comes the mountebank and bids them be attentive, and then said, *Hoc omnes vultis, vili e- more et cito vendere:* and another said *Omnes laudari se exoptant,* this Austin finds fault withall. *ut si dixissent, inquit, omnes beati esse vultis; misere esse non vultis, dixissent aliquid, aut nullum in sua non agnosceret voluntate:* Behold then this happinesse to enjoy the favor of God to have communion with him, labor therefore for this, al means that God hath appointed, particularly this *Sacrament* in w^{ch} God invites us now at this time, wherein God offers himselfe to every bekeever in a most neer communion: the *Sybarites*, when they invited to a feast were wont to give their women a yceres warning to deck and trim and prepare themselves: this is an anniversary solemnity with some, and it were to be wished it werenot so feldome with us: let us prepare

CHAP 3.

our selves accordingly to be fit guests; for this table, not without the wedding garment: that we may present our selves before our God adorned with lively faith in Christ, and a resolute purpose of denying our selves and our lusts and yeelding sincere obedience to all his Commandements, and so he may dwell with us, and we may walk with him: we may be incorporated into him, he may live in us, & we in him: we may be assimilated to him in all holinesse and righteousness and conformed to his image, which neere union is livly set forth in this Sacrament, in a word we may be so nourished with this heavenly manna that we may go on from strength to strength till we see God in Syon:

... Fifthly and lastly, for Consolation for those that enjoy Gods mid all other wants: Excellently the Prophet *Habakuck*, *Although the fig tree shall not blossom, neither shall fruit be in the vines: the labor of the Olive shall faile; and the fields shall yeeld no meate; the fesh shall be cut off from the fold, and there shall be no heard in the stalls: though all earthly comforts forsake us, yet I will rejoyce in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation:*

F I N I S.

Novemb. 26 1639.

Imprimat.

Tho. Wykes.

s.
d
e
r
s
h
e
e
e
r
is
n
r
y
e
fe
l
be
in
ad
ur
be
s,
in